Mike Williams, Chair
Lawyer Assistance/Diversion Proposal - Hearing
Alice Senechal provided a brief update regarding the Supreme Court's recent hearing concerning the Committee's lawyer assistance and diversion proposals. She said it was a generally good hearing, with a few questions directed at the interplay between lawyer diversion and lawyer assistance. She said some of the questions seemed to touch on the feasibility of implementing the program with volunteers. She noted as well that members of the Court were interested in whether assistance program services would be generally available to lawyers, not just to those who may be the subject of a disciplinary complaint.
Christine Hogan noted there was some discussion concerning sources of funding for the program and she had suggested the possibility of obtaining start-up funds from the Board of Law Examiners. She said some thought may be given to contracting with an existing assistance program to provide services if the rule proposals are ultimately adopted.
Multijurisdictional Practice - Review of Further Revisions to Rule 3, Admission to Practice Rules
At the request of Chair Williams, staff distributed and reviewed additional revisions to Rule 3 concerning pro hac vice admission and registration of non-resident attorneys. Staff explained that the distributed material is nearly entirely the same as Attachment B (April 8, 2004), except that it includes style changes identified at the last meeting and overlooked when the revisions in Attachment B were made. He said the principal revisions, as indicated in the staff note, are related to the restructuring of Section B to include in the registration process nonresident attorneys who represent clients in ADR proceedings. He noted that the revised structure is somewhat awkward and may require additional work.
Judge Braaten drew attention to new Section B(2)(c) and the requirement that each registered nonresident attorney must complete at least 45 CLE hours during each three-year period in which the attorney is registered. She said such a requirement may be unduly burdensome for an attorney who may represent a client only once or for a very short time in an ADR proceeding. She said the provision seems more clearly related to an attorney registered as in-house counsel in the state, which is addressed in new Section B(1).
It was moved by Randy Lee and seconded by Alice Senechal that Section B2(c) be modified to limit the CLE requirement to attorneys registered as in-house counsel under Section B1.
Christine Hogan observed that the MJP Task Force regarded pro hac vice admission as a process for non-resident attorneys providing legal services in the state for a short time, while registration was directed at non-resident attorneys who were present in the state on a more long-term basis. She said she was uncertain why the Committee chose to subject attorneys involved in ADR proceedings to the registration process, rather than pro hac vice admission. Alice Senechal said one primary reason was the need to deal with situations in which there was no court, tribunal, or other entity that would be available to receive and consider the application for admission. Christine Hogan noted that the Task Force had considered involvement in ADR only within the context of court-annexed programs, as opposed to private ADR proceedings.
Bob Udland asked whether registration under new Section B2, in referring to "representing" a client, would apply to, for example, a mediator. Staff noted that the phrase "representing as client" was used because it tracks language included in the Comment to revised Rule 5.5.
After further discussion, the motion carried unanimously.
Staff noted that Section B2(f) regarding pro hac vice admission for a registered attorney also seems more directly related to an attorney registered as in-house counsel. He asked whether the provision should be clarified concerning its application to an attorney registered for purposes of involvement in an ADR proceeding.
It was moved by Tim Priebe, seconded by Alice Senechal, and carried unanimously that Section B2(f) be modified to restrict its application to attorneys registered as in-house counsel under Section B1.
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that Section B2 be modified to refer to alternative dispute resolution "proceeding", rather than "process".
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Tim Priebe, and carried unanimously that paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section B2 be modified to replace "attorney is eligible" with "attorney becomes eligible".
Randy Lee observed that long before MJP had become a significant issue for discussion there was a well-established caselaw rule, recognized in nearly every state, regarding a lawyer's occasional entry into another state for non-litigation purposes. He said the rule essentially provides that a lawyer licensed in one state who is required to go to another state to provide a non-litigation service for a client would be safe from charges of practicing in the state without a license. The lawyer's activity, he said, was considered isolated, brief, and related to the lawyer's lawful practice in the state in which the lawyer was licensed. He asked whether the proposed process would change that longstanding practice. If it does not, he said it may be worthwhile to make clear that no change is intended.
Alice Senechal noted the question may be addressed by the safe-harbor provision in proposed Rule 5.5(b)(2).
Elaine Fremling suggested Section B should be restructured as the internal references seem to create unintended connections between parts of the section and the progression of requirements is difficult to follow. Staff agreed the section could be reorganized to more clearly describe the process without any change to the substantive elements of the section..
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that Section B be restructured for clarity and consistent references and that the Chair is authorized to approve the restructured proposal before submission to the Board of Governors for review and comment.
Multijurisdictional Practice - Review of Revisions to Rule 5.5, Rules of Professional Conduct
At the request of Chair Williams, staff reviewed additional revisions to Rule 5.5 included in Attachment C (April 8, 2004). Staff said the revisions are directly related to the registration approach now contained in proposed Rule 3 and are found in the 6th and 7th paragraphs of the Comment (reflecting the registration requirement and deleting references to pro hac vice admission for attorneys involved in ADR) and proposed paragraph (b)(3), where a reference to registration is included to reflect the explanatory reference to the paragraph in the Comment's 7th paragraph. He asked whether including the reference to registration in the safe-harbor provided in paragraph (b)(3) would have any unintended consequences.
With respect to requiring registration, rather than pro hac vice admission, for lawyers involved in ADR, Christine Hogan observed that other states have been expanding pro hac vice admission to include court-annexed ADR. She said if North Dakota does not follow that approach there will be a lack of uniformity on this issue among the various jurisdictions.
Mike Williams recalled the Committee's early conclusion that there was no significant difference between court-annexed ADR, which would be regulated under the initial proposal, and private ADR, which arguably was not. He said the decision to include nonresident attorneys involved in private ADR proceedings in the rule resulted in taking a different approach under the proposed rule.
Randy Lee drew attention to the earlier issue concerning a nonresident attorney who appears occasionally in North Dakota with respect to nonlitigation matters. He said upon further review it does not appear the safe-harbor in paragraph (b)(2) would provide protection because that paragraph is subject to the qualifier in the opening paragraph that the attorney be involved in representing a client. As an example, he described a situation in which an attorney licensed in Minnesota is advising a company on an issue and in connection with some question the attorney comes to North Dakota to interview a person to obtain information. There is, he said, no "representation" of the client involved; the objective is simply to obtain information.
Mike Williams wondered whether the Comment regarding paragraph (b)(2) addresses the situation in its statement that the provision is intended to provide broad protection for several kinds of work in this state that are related to the lawyer's work in the lawyer's home state. Judge Braaten said the introductory language for paragraph (b) seems to be worded incorrectly and appears inconsistent with the Comment's explanation. Randy Lee suggested the possibility of simply recognizing that the rule does not address the described situation, which would result in reverting to the protection provided by the common law rule. He additionally noted that the reference in the introductory paragraph to "in this jurisdiction" with regard to representing a client may be misplaced and contributing to the confusion concerning the intended meaning of the language.
It was moved by Randy Lee and seconded by Elaine Fremling that the introductory
language to paragraph (b)(2) be modified to read: "A lawyer admitted to practice in another
jurisdiction, but not in this jurisdiction, who represents, in this jurisdiction, a client
jurisdiction on a temporary basis ... does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this
jurisdiction when: ".
Tim Priebe suggested the qualifier "in this jurisdiction" might be more appropriately placed after "on a temporary basis." Bob Udland said the language would still likely confuse the practicing attorney because the language is unclear regarding the actual location of the client being represented.
After further discussion, the motion failed.
Alice Senechal observed that the Comment refers most often to an attorney "providing legal services", rather than to representing a client. She said the reference to providing legal services more likely describes the circumstances described by Randy Lee in his earlier example. Additionally, she said the reference to "state", when "jurisdiction" is otherwise used, might invite a question concerning whether an actual difference in meaning is intended.
Following discussion, it was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Elaine Fremling, and
carried unanimously that the introductory language to paragraph (b)(2) be modified to read:
" A lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction
, but and not in this jurisdiction , who
represents a client performs legal services in this state jurisdiction on a temporary basis does
not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when: ".
Alice Senechal drew attention to the last sentence in the Comment pertaining to paragraph (c)(1) which discusses registered lawyers having to satisfy certain requirements to "become and remain" a member of the association, except for passing the bar examination. She wondered whether the sentence is clear in meaning or adds anything necessary to the Comment's explanation. Christine Hogan said the MJP Task Force regarded registration as a long-term situation and thus a registered attorney would be required to satisfy the same requirements as other attorneys with respect to such things as CLE, compliance with discipline rules, and payment of dues. The only exception, she said, is that the registered lawyer would not be required to pass the bar exam. Alice Senechal asked whether the language is necessary in light of the changes to Rule 3 regarding registration. Randy Lee said the Comment's references to Rule 3 with respect to application of that rule should be sufficient to alert registering attorneys to the particular requirements.
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Judge Braaten, and carried unanimously that the noted language be deleted.
Chair Williams said the revisions would be made to Rule 5.5 and Section B of Rule 3 would be restructured as discussed.
It was moved by Randy Lee, seconded by Judge Braaten, and carried unanimously that,
subject to the Chair's approval of the Rule 3 restructure and after concurrence by the Board
of Governors with the revised MJP proposals, the proposed amendments to Rule 5.5 and Rule
8.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 3 of the Admission to Practice Rules be
submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration.
Model Rule 1.18 - Duties to Prospective Client
At the request of Chair Williams. Alice Senechal reviewed Attachment D (April 8, 2004) - her report concerning Model Rule 1.18, which has no current counterpart in the North Dakota rules. She explained that the model rule addresses situations in which there is some contact between a lawyer and a "prospective" client before the lawyer-client relationship is established. In essence, she said, the model rule allows the lawyer to represent a client who would be adverse to the person who made the contact if the person does not become a client and the lawyer minimizes the amount of information received through the contact. She noted the apparent confusing or inconsistent use of "prospective client" in Model Rule 1.18 and new Rule 7.3 governing solicitation of clients. She distributed an email exchange with ABA staff regarding the issue which indicates the staff conclusion that there likely is no cause for concern. A copy of the email is attached as Appendix A. She suggested there may, in fact, be a need at a minimum to clarify in the Comment the use of the phrase or, perhaps, use different language in one or the other of the rules. An additional issue, she said, is the reference to "informed consent" in 1.18(d)(i) and in the Comment, which should be modified in light of the Committee's early conclusion not to include the model rules' informed consent requirement.
With respect to the reference to "prospective client", Randy Lee said that both Rules 1.18 and 7.3 discuss persons who might become a client. The concern, he said, is that there could be a circumstance in which the same person could be involved in a situation governed by both rules. Alice Senechal said a situation may arise in which a person contacts a lawyer and has some preliminary discussions, which would be subject to Rule 1.18, but the lawyer would be prohibited by Rule 7.3 from following up on the contact because it would be considered contact with a "prospective client." That, she said, could not be a reasonably intended application of the rules since the follow-up contact would clearly not be considered a "solicitation" as contemplated under Rule 7.3.
Mike Williams wondered whether "potential client" could be used instead. Alice Senechal noted that the definition of "prospective client" in Rule 1.18(a) tracks into Rule 7.3, but one option could be to explain in the Comment that the definition in Rule 1.18 is limited to that rule.
Elaine Fremling asked whether the issue is in the use and meaning of the term "client". She noted that in the insurance industry there are "clients" and "prospects", but there is no such thing as a "prospective client".
After further discussion, it was moved by Judge Braaten, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that "potential client" be substituted throughout Rule 1.18 for "prospective client".
In response to a question from Jean Hannig, Alice Senechal said language could be added in the Comment to explain that "potential client" is being used to indicate the intended difference from "prospective client" as used in Rule 7.3.
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that
written consent replace the informed consent requirement in Rule 1.18(d) and the Comment.
Alice Senechal explained that Rule 1.18 is consistent with several previous North Dakota ethics opinions and with ABA ethics opinions.
Tim Priebe observed that the screening requirement in paragraph (d)(2)(i) is consistent with one of the suggested changes to Rule 1.10 regarding imputed disqualification. He said there may be some inconsistency in having a screening requirement in Rule 1.18 if one is not included in Rule 1.10. Alice Senechal noted there is also a screening requirement in Rule 1.11. Randy Lee said he has never favored screening because it usually does not work. But, he said, Rule 1.18 is greatly needed because it allows lawyers to protect their colleagues when the lawyer has been taken advantage of by a sophisticated client. The rule, he said, leaves the rest of the lawyer's firm free to represent the opposing side when the lawyer who was initially contacted declines to represent the party.
Mike Williams asked whether Rule 1.18 would have any impact upon recently approved Rule 6.5. Alice Senechal said Rule 1.18 is consistent with Rule 6.5 with respect to the status of a person as something akin to a former client. Randy Lee said the question would not arise under Rule 1.18 in light of the provisions set out in Rule 6.5.
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that Rule 1.18, as modified, be adopted.
With respect to the question concerning screening, Alice Senechal said the Committee could return to Rule 1.18 if it appears necessary after reviewing Rule 1.10.
Rule 1.10 - Imputed Disqualification
At the request of Chair Williams, Tim Priebe reviewed Attachment E (April 8, 2004) - his review and comparison of Model Rule and North Dakota Rule 1.10. The first issue, he said, is with respect to the generic reference to "these rules" in current paragraph (a) of North Dakota's rule. He said the model rule refers to specific rules that would apply. He recalled that Model Rule 1.8 contained paragraph (k), which the Committee has not yet adopted and which would impute disqualifications based on all the prohibitions addressed in the rule. He said current Rule 1.10(a) would impute the prohibitions included in Rule 1.8, consequently there is probably no need to include paragraph (k) in Rule 1.8. Additionally, he suggested if Rule 1.18 remains unchanged, then a reference to the rule should be included in the exceptions noted in paragraph (a) of Rule 1.10. He noted the new added language under paragraph (a) of the model rule pertaining to disqualifications based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer.
It was moved by Tim Priebe, seconded by Alice Senechal, and carried unanimously that paragraph (a) of Rule 1.10 be modified to include references to Rules 1.18 and 6.5 in the existing rule exceptions.
Tim Priebe said adding the model rule language concerning the exception from disqualification based on personal interests could provide a significant "out" for attorneys with potential conflict situations. By way of related background, Randy Lee explained that Rule 1.7 establishes three kinds of conflicts and the added language in Model Rule 1.10(a) refers only to the one kind of conflict that arises because of a conflict between the personal interests of the lawyer and the interests of the client. The added language, he said, does appear broader in scope, allowing a lawyer to argue that the interest, whatever it may be, is merely a "personal" interest.
Bob Udland noted the difference with respect to imputing conflicts when an individual lawyer is involved as opposed to when a large law firm is involved. There is a distinction, he said, between the personal interests of a lawyer which may give rise to a conflict and imputing disqualification to other members of a firm. He said he would support adding the model rule language to paragraph (a).
Randy Lee said he would not object to adding the new language if particular personal interests were identified instead of using the model rule's broad, simple reference to "personal interests."
Bob Udland said the Comment to the current North Dakota rule seems to address personal interests in providing that such interests cannot be allowed to affect the lawyer's representation and then setting out examples of possible compromising personal interests. Tim Priebe noted that under current Rule 1.10(d) a disqualification under the rule may be waived if the client consents after consultation.
Jean Hannig wondered whether the personal interests addressed in Model Rule 1.10(a) are of a different kind from those governed by Rule 1.7. For example, she said the model rule comment regarding paragraph (a) mentions political belief as a kind of personal interest that would not necessarily disqualify the firm.
Bob Udland asked how it would be possible to include personal interest in a computerized conflict-checking system.
Randy Lee reiterated that he might support including the model rule language if "personal interest" is defined. He suggested the possibility of including in paragraph (a) the examples of personal interests identified in the comment to Rule 1.7.
After further discussion, Committee members agreed that for review and discussion purposes paragraph (a) should be modified if possible to include specific kinds of personal interests that would serve as exceptions to the general disqualification under paragraph (a). The comments to Rules 1.7 and 1.10 should be reviewed as sources for the kinds of personal interests to be listed.
Randy Lee further noted that the personal interests to be addressed in Rule 1.10(a) would be different in kind from a lawyer's personal interests involved when conducting a business transaction with a client, which is subject to Rule 1.8(a).
Continuing with his review of Rule 1.10, Tim Priebe recommended no changes to paragraph (b).
It was moved by Tim Priebe, seconded by Alice Senechal, and carried unanimously that no changes be made to paragraph (b).
It was moved by Tim Priebe, seconded by Alice Senechal, and carried unanimously that no changes by made to paragraph (c).
It was moved by Tim Priebe, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that in keeping with the Committee's previous decision paragraph (d) should be modified to require client consent "in writing".
Rule 2.3 - Evaluation for Use by Third Parties
Bob Udland then reviewed Attachment F (April 8, 2004) - his review and comparison of Model Rule and North Dakota Rule 2.3. He said the model rule clarifies application of the rule and is better structured. He noted the references to "informed consent", which should be changed in light of the Committee's general approach regarding the concept.
It was moved by Bob Udland, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously that Model Rule 2.3 be adopted with the substitution of "consent in writing" for "informed consent" where required.
Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and Contentions; Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation
Mike Williams reviewed Attachment G (April 8, 2004) - his review and comparison of Model Rules and North Dakota Rules 3.1 and 3.2. He said Model Rule and North Dakota Rule 3.1 are essentially the same except the model rule adds "in law and fact" in the first sentence of the rule.
It was moved by Alice Senechal, seconded by Bob Udland, and carried unanimously that Rule 3.1 be modified to include "in law and fact".
Mike Williams said Model Rule and North Dakota Rule 3.2 are identical and no changes are recommended. Committee members agreed.
Rule 3.3 - Candor to the Tribunal
Randy Lee distributed his assessment of Model Rule and North Dakota Rule 3.3 to which, he said, two changes were necessary: 1) on the first page, the first line of the second paragraph should read " First, the points on which the ABA rule and the North Dakota rule agree:"; and 2) on the next to the last page, the penultimate sentence in the second paragraph should end at "material", i.e. the reference to the issue of division of property should be deleted. A copy of the analysis, with the noted changes, is attached as Appendix B.
Randy Lee said the significant difference between the two rules is that under the North Dakota rule, if an attorney has offered testimony from a client and later learns that the testimony was false, and the attorney fails in getting the client to recant, then the attorney must attempt to withdraw without giving a reason. The North Dakota rule, he said, further provides that if the judge denies the withdrawal, the attorney must continue in the representation. The Model Rule, he said, provides that if false testimony from anyone, including a client is offered, the attorney is required to take reasonable remedial measures to try to get the client to recant or, if that effort is unsuccessful, disclose the false testimony. He said North Dakota's obligation to disclose testimony later learned to be false does not extend to testimony that came from a client's sworn testimony. He said the "WHY?" portion of the analysis explains that North Dakota's rule departed from the then model rule because of the decision to write into the rule the Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in Matter of Malloy. He said if the Committee decides to adopt the current model rule, the result will significantly alter the effect of North Dakota's case law precedent.
Randy Lee said he had no recommendation regarding whether to follow the model rule to the extent that it would reject Malloy. The remainder of the model rule changes, he said, are relatively minor and nothing would be lost in adopting them.
Chair Williams said the immediate decision for the Committee is whether to continue the Malloy approach, which prohibits disclosure by the lawyer, or adopt the ABA approach, which permits disclosure.
Judge Braaten said the ABA rule seems to be an improvement with respect to what a lawyer is permitted or required to do in the event false testimony is offered. Bob Udland noted that North Dakota's current rule does provide some guidance regarding how the court should address the issue. The ABA rule, he said, is less clear on what happens when the lawyer discloses the false testimony.
Randy Lee noted that when Malloy was decided it was very unclear how to reconcile the two ethical provisions concerning the duty to keep a confidence and the duty of candor to a tribunal.
Mike Williams said there is the principle that a client does not have a reasonable expectation that a lawyer will assist the client in lying, while at the same time if the client, unknown to the lawyer, does lie, the lawyer is helpless to do anything about it. He said the circumstance lends itself to the poor public image of lawyers.
After further discussion, it was moved by Judge Braaten and seconded by Alice Senechal to adopt the ABA approach rather than the current rule's reflection of Malloy.
Jean Hannig observed that the ABA rule does not prevent a lawyer from requesting permission to withdraw from the case. Randy Lee agreed and said the rule, because the lawyer would have the obligation to inform the court, also implicitly permits the lawyer to give a reason for requesting withdrawal. Jean Hannig noted that the rule is premised on the lawyer "knowing", rather than reasonably believing, that the client intends to offer false testimony, which prevents the lawyer from too easily disclosing client confidences.
Following further discussion, the motion carried unanimously.
It was moved by Randy Lee, seconded by Jean Hannig, and carried unanimously that the remainder of Model Rule 3.3 be adopted.
Rule 3.4 - Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel; Rule 3.5 - Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
Jean Hannig then reviewed Attachment H (April 8, 2004) - her review and comparison of Model Rules and North Dakota Rules 3.4 and 3.5. With respect to Rule 3.4, she said the model rule and North Dakota rule are nearly identical except for the addition in paragraph (a) of the model rule of "A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act". Randy Lee said the absence of similar language in North Dakota's rule is likely because the subject matter is addressed in Rule 8.4(a).
It was moved by Jean Hannig, seconded by Tim Priebe, and carried unanimously that no changes be made to current Rule 3.4.
With respect to Rule 3.5, Jean Hannig said she prefers the structure of the current rule. The model rule, she said, adds a new paragraph (c) regarding communication with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury. She said the model rule also prohibits ex parte communications with those identified in paragraph (a) unless communication is permitted by law or court order. She noted that paragraph (a) of the North Dakota rule also refers to ex parte communications concerning a "pending or impending proceeding." She suggested retaining the current rule with the addition in paragraph (a) of allowing ex parte communications if permitted by law or a court order, and the addition of the model rule paragraph regarding communication with a juror or prospective juror.
With respect to the suggested change to paragraph (a), Judge Braaten noted that the provision addresses both ex parte communications with and seeking to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other officer. She wondered when a court would authorize a lawyer to influence a judge or juror. Committee members agreed separating the two provisions, as the model rule does, seems more appropriate as the noted authorization would pertain only to ex parte communications.
Judge Braaten suggested that if the provisions are separated as in the model rule, then paragraph (b) regarding ex parte communications should be modified to replace the reference to "such a person" with a references to those identified in paragraph (a). Committee members agreed.
It was moved by Jean Hannig, seconded by Randy Lee, and carried unanimously to adopt Model Rule 3.5 with the noted change to paragraph (b) and the additional inclusion in paragraph (b) of the current rule's reference to "concerning a pending or impending proceeding".
Motion/Reciprocity Admission - North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana
Randy Lee reviewed Attachment I (April 8, 2004) - his report and comparison of North Dakota's motion admission rule and activities in South Dakota and Montana regarding reciprocal admission. He noted that South Dakota recently adopted a new rule and Montana is considering a proposed motion admission rule. He said there are many differences among the rules which are outlined in the Attachment I chart.
Christine Hogan said that if Montana adopts the proposals under consideration, then North Dakota should adopt a streamlined reciprocity process with Montana and South Dakota, one consequence of which would be to eliminate some of North Dakota's affidavit requirements.
Randy Lee suggested the Committee should wait until Montana acts on the proposals under review. Christine Hogan agreed.
It was moved by Randy Lee, seconded by Bob Udland, and carried unanimously that consideration of the issue be tabled.
Model Rule for Expanded Legal Assistance for Military Personnel
Chair Williams drew attention to Attachment J (April 8, 2004) - a referral from the Supreme Court of review of the ABA model rule concerning legal assistance for military personnel.
Randy Lee said the model rule would provide great latitude for appearance by military lawyers in state court. Bob Udland said representation would be provided to a relatively small population of lower grade enlisted personnel who cannot afford counsel. Typically, he said, representation would be provided in such matters as divorces, landlord/tenant, and minor collection actions. The alternative, he said, is that many of these personnel would have to seek services from Legal Assistance.
Bob Udland agreed to review the model rule and provide a report at a future meeting.
Randy Lee recalled the Committee's earlier work regarding Rule 1.19 (client files and papers) and the Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the rule. He noted that the rule did not address an issue discussed recently in a Texas case, In re George, 28 SW3rd 511. That issue, he said, concerns the return to a client of papers held by a lawyer who is disqualified from representation because of a conflict of interest. He said the question is whether Rule 1.19 should be modified to prohibit the return of client papers that contain information that is protected as to some other person.
Alice Senechal agreed to review the Rule 1.19 and the Texas case and provide a report at the next meeting.
Rule Review Assignments
The following rule review assignments for the June 8 meeting were made: Rule 3.6 - Judge
Braaten; Rule 3.7 - Mike Williams; Rule 3.8 - Ron Reichert; Rule 3.9 - Jean Hannig; Rule 4.1 -
Randy Lee; Rule 4.2 - Alice Senechal; Rule 4.3 - Tim Priebe; and Rule 4.4 - Randy Lee.