Transportation Dept.

Barros v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 132,
The Department of Transportation is not required to call all persons who have handled a blood sample to establish a chain of custody for the sample. To establish chain of custody and introduce the results of a blood test, the Department's must show that the sample tested is the same one originally drawn from the defendant.
Peterson v. Ziegler , 2008 ND 115,
Generally, the time computation rules in N.D.R.Civ.P. 6 apply to an appeal from an administrative agency decision unless the provisions of the rule conflict with a governing statute.
A driver is not harmed by a law enforcement officer's failure to give the implied consent advisory before the driver consents to a chemical test.
Richter v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 105, 750 N.W.2d 430
Evidence that is excludable on constitutional grounds may be excluded by an administrative agency upon proper objection.
Hoover v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 87, 748 N.W.2d 730
Eyewitness testimony is not necessary to establish reasonable grounds to believe a person was driving under the influence; circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
If a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect, the officer has the right to accompany and monitor the movements of the suspect.
Ike v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 85, 748 N.W.2d 692
The issuance of a temporary operator's permit to a driver having an alcohol concentration exceeding the per se limit is a basic and mandatory requirement under N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1. The issuance of the permit serves as the Department's official notification to the driver of the Department's intent to revoke, suspend, or deny driving privileges.
An officer's error as to a provision that is not basic and mandatory to the Department's authority to proceed is not reversible when there is no prejudice.
Buchholtz v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 53, 746 N.W.2d 181
Fair administration of an Intoxilyzer test may be established by proof that the method approved by the State Toxicologist for conducting the test has been scrupulously followed.
"Observing" a DUI arrestee is not the only manner of "ascertaining" that the arrestee had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within the twenty minutes prior to the collection of the breath sample as required by the approved method.
Schumacher v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 19, 747 N.W.2d 136
Revocation of driving privileges is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Lies v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation , 2008 ND 30, 744 N.W.2d 783
Individuals arrested for DUI must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.
The failure to allow a DUI arrestee a reasonable opportunity to consult with a lawyer after the arrestee has made such a request prevents the revocation of his driver's license for refusal to take a chemical test.
There are no bright-line rules for determining whether a "reasonable opportunity" to consult with an attorney has been afforded; rather, the determination of whether a reasonable opportunity has been provided turns on an objective review of the totality of the circumstances.
Sandoval v. Department of Transportation , 2008 ND 22, 747 N.W.2d 136
Revocation of driving privileges for three years is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Leno v. Department of Transportation , 2008 ND 10, 743 N.W.2d 794
The Department is not required to show an Intoxilyzer machine has been recalibrated following a movement of the machine to prove an Intoxilyzer test was fairly administered.
An agency's decision will be affirmed if its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. When deciding whether a preponderance of the evidence supports an agency's findings, we do not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the agency.
Brewer v. Ziegler , 2007 ND 207, 743 N.W.2d 391
A highway patrol officer has the express power to enforce the state motor vehicle laws and to enforce all laws relating to the use or presence of alcoholic beverages in motor vehicles, and, therefore, has the power to arrest a person who is located on private property while violating the provisions of those laws.
The failure to give an implied consent advisory does not require exclusion of the preliminary breath test results.
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test results may be used as circumstantial evidence of intoxication without requiring scientific foundation by expert testimony.
Bartch v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2007 ND 201, 743 N.W.2d 109
Display of an expired registration tab on a license plate justifies a traffic stop.
Hawes v. ND Department of Transporation , 2007 ND 177, 741 N.W.2d 202
That the defendant's vehicle is out of gas does not render the vehicle inoperable as a matter of law.
When there has been no objection to a prosecutor's argument, the judgment will not be reversed unless it was an obvious error affecting a defendant's substantial rights.
Sayler v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2007 ND 165, 740 N.W.2d 94
When an administrative order revoking a driver's license is appealed to the district court, the director or the hearing officer who rendered the decision must file a certified transcript of the testimony and all other proceedings within twenty days after receipt of the notice of appeal.
Probable cause to arrest a driver for driving under the influence exists if the police officer (1) observes some signs of physical or mental impairment, and (2) has reason to believe the driver's impairment is caused by alcohol.
Kram v. ND Department of Transportation , 2007 ND 151, 742 N.W.2d 839
An order suspending commercial driving privileges for one year is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
Bienek v. Department of Transportation , 2007 ND 117, 736 N.W.2d 492
Appellate review of administrative license suspensions is limited to the record before the agency.
On legal questions, such as an interpretation of a statute, an agency's decision is fully reviewable on appeal.
When a general statutory provision is in conflict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special provision prevails and is construed as an exception to the general provision unless the general provision is enacted later and it is the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail.
The Administrative Agencies Practice Act requires alleged errors from the administrative level be specifically enumerated for the district court.
Finley v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2007 ND 78, 734 N.W.2d 342
The Department of Transportation's decision to revoke driving privileges is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Whitecalfe v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2007 ND 32, 727 N.W.2d 779
The Department of Transportation must meet the basic and mandatory provisions of the statute to have authority to revoke driving privileges.
When a licensee is arrested for driving under the influence and receives an initial notice of revocation of driving privileges, the licensee is not denied due process simply because the initial notice does not include a statement of the arresting officer's probable cause.
Ehrhardt v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2007 ND 10, 729 N.W.2d 334
Suspension of driver's license summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Unterseher v. Ziegler , 2006 ND 226, 725 N.W.2d 588
Suspension of driving privileges is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Gabel v. N.D. Department of Transportation , 2006 ND 178, 720 N.W.2d 433
A report by a citizen informant that an individual is speeding up and slowing down does not give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk , 2006 ND 137, 717 N.W.2d 586
Traveling at a slower than usual speed, with no further evidence of illegal activity, does not alone create a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.
Lentz v. Spryncznatyk , 2006 ND 27, 708 N.W.2d 859
A statute is employed retroactively when it is applied to a cause of action that arose prior to the effective date of the statute.
A statute is not retroactively applied merely because prior convictions are used that occurred before the effective date of a statute, as long as the triggering offense occurred after the effective date of the statute.
Eriksmoen v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 206, 706 N.W.2d 610
An arrestee's right to consult privately with counsel before taking a chemical test must be balanced against society's interest in obtaining important evidence.
If a person arrested for driving under the influence is asked to submit to a chemical test and responds with a request to speak with an attorney, the failure to allow the arrested person a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney prevents the revocation of her license for refusal to take the test. The reasonableness of the opportunity to consult with counsel is viewed objectively in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Bollin v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 91, 696 N.W.2d 527
Chemical analysis results will not be admitted into evidence if the test was not performed in accordance with methods and devices approved by the state toxicologist.
If the chemical analysis form indicates an alternative disinfectant was used during the blood draw but neither the form nor testimony identifies the disinfectant, license suspension is improper.
Anderson v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 97, 696 N.W.2d 918
An investigative stop of a vehicle requires the officer have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has violated or is violating the law.
Information from a tip may provide the factual basis for a stop.
In evaluating the factual basis for a stop, the totality of the circumstances is considered, including the quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the information available to the officer.
When reasonable and articulable suspicion arises from an informant's tip, there is an inverse relationship between quantity and quality, and the information must be analyzed generally according to the type of tip and its reliability.
A caller-informant must provide at least some specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegations of criminal activity for a stop to be justified based on the call.
Koenig v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 95, 696 N.W.2d 534
The Department does not lack jurisdiction to suspend a license merely because an officer failed to forward test results that were not printed because of a printer malfunction.
Jorgensen v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 80, 695 N.W.2d 212
Inclusion of chemical test results in an officer's certified report to the Director of the North Dakota Department of Transportation under N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1(3) is a basic and mandatory provision without which the department may not suspend a person's driving privileges.
Aker v. ND Department of Transportation , 2005 ND 81, 704 N.W.2d 286
A judgment reversing an administrative agency decision suspending driving privileges is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
May v. Sprynczynatyk , 2005 ND 76, 695 N.W.2d 196
Failure of the Department of Transportation to file the transcript of the administrative hearing within twenty days, as required by N.D.C.C. 39-20-06, does not automatically mandate summary reversal of the decision suspending a driver's license.
To establish systemic disregard of the law by an administrative agency sufficient to warrant reversal of a decision in the agency's favor, a party must demonstrate some persistent pattern of improper agency conduct.
A party must make a specific objection to evidence at the time it is offered for admission into evidence to give the opposing party an opportunity to argue the objection and to give the trial court an opportunity to fully understand the objection and appropriately rule on it.
Harter v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 70, 694 N.W.2d 677
Section 39-20-04.1(1)(a), N.D.C.C., provides penalties for persons under the age of 21 who drive with a blood alcohol concentration of at least .02 percent by weight.
The rule of lenity, which requires ambiguities in the law to be interpreted in favor of a criminal defendant, does not apply in civil cases.
Doll v. ND Department of Transportation , 2005 ND 62, 693 N.W.2d 627
Guidelines for use of a standard solution are not part of the approved method for conducting an Intoxilyzer test unless the State Toxicologist expressly includes them in the approved method filed with the clerk of district court.
Larsen v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 51, 693 N.W.2d 39
In interpreting a statute, a court may not disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, and may not add words to the statute.
Kiecker v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2005 ND 23, 691 N.W.2d 266
The results of a blood-alcohol test must be received in evidence when it is shown that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairy administered, and if the test is shown to have been performed according to methods and with devices approved by the State Toxicologist.
A document is not part of the approved method unless the State Toxicologist expressly includes it in the approved method and makes it a foundational requirement for fair administration.
The installation and repair checkout form is not part of the approved method.
Miller v. Sprynczynatyk , 2005 ND 5, 694 N.W.2d 22
A judgment affirming an administrative agency decision suspending driving privileges is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
Johnson v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 148, 683 N.W.2d 886
An officer who properly arrests a driver for DUI and who obtains, within the officer's jurisdiction, the driver's consent to submit to a blood test can transport the arrestee outside the jurisdiction for the test.
Aamodt v. Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 134, 682 N.W.2d 308
The Department must meet the basic and mandatory provisions of the statute to have authority to suspend driving privileges.
The statutory provision requiring a police officer to include in the notice to the Department reasonable grounds to believe a person had been driving or had been in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is a basic and mandatory provision.
Wetsch v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 93, 679 N.W.2d 282
Refusal to submit to an onsite screening test constitutes a violation of informed consent law and may properly result in a one-year suspension of an individual's driver's license.
An individual's demand to have blood drawn for a chemical screening in a medical environment, such as a hospital, constitutes refusal under North Dakota's informed consent statute.
Gratech Company, Ltd. v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 61, 676 N.W.2d 781
All disputes arising out of any contract entered into by the Department of Transportation for the construction or repair of highways must be submitted to arbitration.
As a condition precedent to arbitration of a highway construction dispute, a contractor seeking additional compensation for work not covered in the contract must file a written notice of claim.
Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk, Director, DOT , 2004 ND 54, 676 N.W.2d 799
In an administrative agency appeal, the specifications of error must identify what matters are truly at issue with sufficient specificity to fairly apprise the agency, other parties, and the court of the particular errors claimed.
The purpose of the specificity requirement is to prevent meaningless specifications of error.
Boilerplate specifications of error are insufficient as a matter of law.
A fact-finder can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Johnson v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 59, 676 N.W.2d 807
The twenty-minute waiting period required before the administration of an Intoxilyzer test can begin before arrest.
The waiting period from the S-D2 test can be used when ascertaining the twenty-minute waiting period for the Intoxilyzer test.
Observing someone is not the only way to ascertain that person has had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke during the twenty minutes preceding an Intoxilyzer test.
A fact-finder can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Lee v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2004 ND 7, 673 N.W.2d 245
In a driver's license administrative hearing involving an Intoxilyzer test, documentation requirements are not met when the approved method of administering the test is not admitted into evidence.
DuPaul v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2003 ND 201, 672 N.W.2d 680
A motorist may not appeal an administrative decision by the Department of Transportation to the district court and simultaneously petition for reconsideration of the Department's denial. If the motorist files a petition for reconsideration, the motorist may appeal the order on reconsideration to the district court.
Hanson v. Director, ND Dept. of Trans. , 2003 ND 175, 671 N.W.2d 780
Weaving twice onto the lane-dividing line on an interstate highway, even without erratic movement or sharp veering, can be sufficient to stop a vehicle.
A vehicle weaving within its own lane may be enough to justify the stop of a vehicle.
Although reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle requires more than a "mere hunch," this standard does not require an officer to see a motorist violate a traffic law.
The totality of circumstances is considered when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop a vehicle.
Rist v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2003 ND 113, 665 N.W.2d 45
Community caretaking justifies law enforcement contact without reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct.
If an officer learns something during a caretaking encounter that causes a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the encounter can lead to further investigation, seizure, and even arrest.
Probable cause to arrest a person for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor can exist without establishing the vehicle's operability or the location of the vehicle's ignition key.
Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk , 2003 ND 90, 663 N.W.2d 161
For a law enforcement officer to testify about the results of a sobriety test, the proper foundation to be established is evidence of the officer's training and experience in administering the test and evidence that the test was properly administered.
Probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence of drugs exists when an officer: 1) observes signs of a driver's physical or mental impairment; and 2) has reason to believe the impairment is caused by drugs.
Johnson v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2002 ND 167, 655 N.W.2d 84
License suspension is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Obrigewitch v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transportation , 2002 ND 177, 653 N.W.2d 73
Probable cause to arrest a person for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor can exist without establishing the location of the ignition key.
Continually avoiding or ignoring a police officer's request to submit to a blood alcohol test can be a refusal to submit to a chemical test.
Phipps v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2002 ND 112, 646 N.W.2d 704
A chemical test is performed when a breath, blood, or urine sample is taken and preserved for analysis.
Performance of a chemical test does not ensure the admissibility of the test results.
A chemical test performed exactly two hours after driving is performed within two hours of driving.
Knoll v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2002 ND 84, 644 N.W.2d 191
If a person intentionally or unintentionally provides false information to an operator attempting to follow the State Toxicologist's approved methods for a chemical test, the person cannot challenge the foundation for admissibility of the test results on the ground that the false information resulted in the approved methods not being followed.
The outcome of a related criminal prosecution for driving under the influence is not relevant in an administrative proceeding to suspend a driver's license.
Isaak v. Sprynczynatyk , 2002 ND 64, 642 N.W.2d 860
A driving record is a regularly kept record, and establishes prima facie its contents.
A party appealing from an administrative hearing officer's decision must comply with the specifications-of-error requirement.
Henderson v. Director, ND Dept. of Trans. , 2002 ND 44, 640 N.W.2d 714
The Supreme Court exercises a limited review in appeals involving drivers' license suspensions or revocations.
Reliability and accuracy of an Intoxilyzer test result is established by demonstrating compliance with the methods adopted by the state toxicologist.
Buchholz v. ND Department of Transportation , 2002 ND 23, 639 N.W.2d 490
A test operator scrupulously complies with the State Toxicologist's approved method to conduct a breath test if the test operator observes that the subject had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke in the twenty minutes prior to the collection of a breath sample.
Piatz v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2002 ND 20, 642 N.W.2d 532
Judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Department of Transportation suspending driver's license for driving under the influence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Lapp v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2001 ND 140, 632 N.W.2d 419
In determining whether an officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the test is whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation in suspecting potential criminal activity.
Community caretaking justifies law enforcement contact without reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct.
Wetzel v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2001 ND 35, 622 N.W.2d 180
Whether a person has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney is a mixed question of law and fact.
The reasonableness of the opportunity given an arrestee to contact an attorney is tested objectively, focusing on the totality of the circumstances.
Doyle v. Sprynczynatyk , 2001 ND 8, 621 N.W.2d 353
Points on a driving record must be reduced for completion of a defensive driver course only if the points are accumulated prior to completing the course. Points accumulate when entered on the driving record, not at the date of the traffic citation or conviction.
Rott v. ND Department of Transportation , 2000 ND 175, 617 N.W.2d 475
A statute providing for the cancellation of a minor's driver's license upon accumulation of a point total in excess of five points is not applied retroactively when the offense triggering the cancellation occurs after the effective date of the statute. Enactment of the statute does not change the status of the minor's driver's license so as to require notification of the statute's enactment.
Houn v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 2000 ND 131, 613 N.W.2d 29
A person arrested for driving under the influence who refuses to submit to a blood-alcohol test may cure that refusal by consenting to a test within a reasonable time after the refusal if the subsequent test will still be accurate, testing equipment or facilities are still available, the subject has been in custody and under observation since the arrest, and the subsequent test will not result in substantial inconvenience or expense to law enforcement.
Kouba v. State of ND, Dept. of Transportation , 1999 ND 233, 603 N.W.2d 696
The Department of Transportation may not suspend an operator's license for failure to appear, if the operator appeared for the initial hearing.
Seela v. Moore , 1999 ND 243, 603 N.W.2d 480
Probable cause to arrest a driver for D.U.I. requires some signs of physical or mental impairment by the driver and reason to believe the impairment is caused by alcohol.
Fourth Amendment violations turn on an objective assessment of the officer's actions, in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind or subjective beliefs.
Kappel v. Department of Transportation , 1999 ND 213, 602 N.W.2d 718
Reasonable suspicion may be established without an officer observing a particular violation of the law.
Two factors, which standing alone may not establish reasonable suspicion, together may constitute reasonable suspicion.
Morrell v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 1999 ND 140, 598 N.W.2d 111
Driver is denied procedural due process where the hearing notice wrongly states the proposed suspension period is for 91 days, rather than 365 days.
Ringsaker v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 1999 ND 127, 596 N.W.2d 328
When the Intoxilyzer prints an incorrect date, and the State Toxicologist does not testify, the Department has failed to show the test was fairly administered.
Gajewski v. Dornacker , 1999 ND 124, 603 N.W.2d 705
A district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(6), because the appeal was filed in the wrong county.
Fuchs v. Moore , 1999 ND 27, 589 N.W.2d 902
Administrative res judicata bars an agency from raising issues in new proceedings which could have been resolved in prior formal adjudicative proceedings that have become final.
License suspension proceedings for driver failing a DUI test are not barred, under administrative res judicata doctrine, by prior revocation proceedings, based upon driver's failure to test, which were dismissed prior to formal adjudication.
Hollis v. Moore , 1998 ND 210, 595 N.W.2d 602
A district court order affirming revocation of driver's license is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).
Stanton v. Moore , 1998 ND 213, 587 N.W.2d 148
A reasonable inference a person was the driver is sufficient to suspend a person's driving privileges under N.D.C.C. 39-20-05(2).
Anton v. Moore , 1998 ND 205, 595 N.W.2d 602
District court judgment reinstating driver's license is summarily reversed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(b).
Mead v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 1998 ND App 2, 581 N.W.2d 145
Sections 44-08-20(3) and 29-06-02, N.D.C.C., authorize a peace officer responding to a valid request for aid and assistance from another law enforcement agency to complete the investigation and make a warrantless arrest of a person outside the peace officer's jurisdiction.
Luebke v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 1998 ND 110, 579 N.W.2d 189
Upon request, a person arrested for DUI must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test at his own expense.
Access to a telephone and telephone book to arrange an independent test will often satisfy minimum requirements of reasonableness.
Before law officers need do more than allow telephone access, an arrestee must inform law enforcement he has made arrangements for an independent test with a qualified person.
Presteng v. Director, ND DOT , 1998 ND 114, 579 N.W.2d 212
Probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence exists where the vehicle operator was involved in an accident and also exhibited reasonable signs of alcohol consumption, including bloodshot, glassy eyes and an odor of alcohol.
Rheaume v. Dir., ND Dept. of Transportation , 1998 ND 2, 576 N.W.2d 524
Driver's license revocation summarily affirmed under NDRAppP 35.1(a)(5).
Baer v. Director, ND Dept of Transportation , 1997 ND 222, 571 N.W.2d 829
Arresting police officer has probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence when driving was erratic almost causing an accident, and driver had difficultly handling his license, exited vehicle with a stagger, had strong odor of alcohol, "glossy" eyes, and a "distinct stare."
Larson v. Moore, Director, ND DOT , 1997 ND 227, 571 N.W.2d 151
An analytical report must be made and forwarded for every test sample obtained by an officer.
Wheeling v. Director, ND DOT , 1997 ND 193, 569 N.W.2d 273
A traffic violation observed prior to a checkpoint provides a proper basis for a stop without addressing the validity of the checkpoint.
Kahl v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 1997 ND 147, 567 N.W.2d 197
Even though a defendant has served the full period of suspension of his driver's license prior to an appeal, the appeal is not moot. If a police officer observes even a minor traffic violation, the officer has grounds to stop the vehicle.
Tooley v. Moore, Director of N.D.D.O.T. , 1997 ND 120, 565 N.W.2d 46
An officer does not deny an arrested driver the reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent saliva test when the test is not reasonably available.
Larson v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 1997 ND 114, 564 N.W.2d 628
Detention of intoxicated person for detoxification without notifying family will not lead to dismissal of driver's license suspension, unless the detention actually prejudices the intoxicated person. There is no systematic disregard for the law when an arresting officer makes an individualized determination that a driver's detention for detoxification is necessary to protect the driver and others.
Russell v. Moore , 1997 ND 111, 564 N.W.2d 278
To support a driver's license suspension, a chemical test must be performed within two hours of driving. When more than one reasonable inference can be made from the evidence, a reviewing court must affirm the inference made by the hearing officer.
Nelson v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 1997 ND 81, 562 N.W.2d 562
The hearing officer was reasonable in finding the report and notice form was received by the Department of Transportation within five days of the date it was issued to Nelson, even though the offense occurred on March 15, 1996, and the report and notice form was stamped "Received Mar 14 1996."
Pavek v. Moore , 1997 ND 77, 562 N.W.2d 574
Suspension of plaintiff's commercial driving privileges was improper because the Department of Transportation Hearing Officer could not establish the time of driving and did not determine if an Intoxilyzer test was given within two hours of driving.
Tabert v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 1997 ND 39, 560 N.W.2d 883
Foundational evidence was sufficient to admit blood-test results at hearing on driver's license suspension.
Scott v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 557 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1996)
An unarrested driver cannot cure a refusal of an 960060 on-site screening test with an independent blood test.
Schwind v. ND Department of Transportation , 562 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996)
Suspension of driver's license affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1.
Chadwick v. Moore , 551 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1996)
The police officer had probable cause to arrest a motorcyclist for DUI.
Tschaekofske v. ND Department of Transportation , 551 N.W.2d 567 (N.D. 1996)
McPeak v. Moore , 545 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1996)
Moran v. ND Dept. of Trans. , 543 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1996)
Zimmerman v. ND Department of Transportation , 543 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1996)
Lock v. Moore , 541 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1995)
Hawley v. Dir., Dept. of Transportation , 544 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1995)
Rudolph v. ND Dept. of Transportation Director , 539 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1995)
Axtman v. Moore, ND Dept. Transportation , 534 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 1995)
Wingerter v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 530 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1995)
Knudson v. Director, ND Dept. of Transporation , 530 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1995)
Mayo v. Moore, Director, Dept. of Trans. , 527 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1995)
Olson v. ND Dept. of Transportation Director , 523 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1994)
Wolf v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 523 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1994)
Baillie v. Moore, Dir., ND Dept. of Trans. , 522 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1994)
Dowhaniuk v. Department of Transportation , 524 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1994)
Samdahl v. ND Dept. of Transportation Dir. , 518 N.W.2d 714 (N.D. 1994)
Peterson v. ND Dept. of Trans. , 518 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1994)
Kraft v. Moore , 517 N.W.2d 643 (N.D. 1994)
Bosch v. Moore , 517 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1994)
Hettich v. Moore , 514 N.W.2d 378 (N.D. 1994)
Maher v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 510 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1994)
Sabinash v. Director of the Dept. of Transportation , 509 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1993)
Fode v. Director of the Department of Transportation , 507 N.W.2d 541 (N.D. 1993)
Salter v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 505 N.W.2d 111 (N.D. 1993)
Dittus v. ND Department of Transportation , 502 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1993)
McNamara v. Director of ND Dept. of Transportation , 500 N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1993)
Broeckel v. State Highway Commissioner , 498 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1993)
Boehm v. Backes , 493 N.W.2d 671 (N.D. 1992)
Richardson v. Director of the Department of Transportation , 497 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1992)
State ex rel. Backes v. A Motor Vehicle , 492 N.W.2d 595 (N.D. 1992)
Ertelt v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 491 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1992)
Dibble v. Backes , 489 N.W.2d 885 (N.D. 1992)
Putney v. Backes , 489 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1992)
Woessner v. Backes , 489 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1992)
Domres v. Backes , 487 N.W.2d 605 (N.D. 1992)
Boyce v. Backes , 488 N.W.2d 45 (N.D. 1992)
Kummer v. Backes , 486 N.W.2d 252 (N.D. 1992)
Frost v. ND Department of Transportation , 487 N.W.2d 6 (N.D. 1992)
Ding v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 484 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1992)
Ehrlich v. Backes , 477 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1991)
Bryl v. Backes , 477 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1991)
Salvaggio v. ND Department of Transportation , 477 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1991)
Fetzer v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 474 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1991)
Cady v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 472 N.W.2d 467 (N.D. 1991)
Holler v. ND Department of Transportation Director , 470 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1991)
Wagner v. Backes , 470 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1991)
Price v. ND Department of Transportation Director , 469 N.W.2d 560 (N.D. 1991)
Davis v. Director, ND Department of Transportation , 467 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1991)
Throlson v. Backes , 466 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1991)
Glaspey v. Backes , 462 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1990)
Wiederholt v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 462 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1990)
Vogel v. Director, ND Department of Transportation , 462 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1990)
Schwind v. Director, ND Department of Transportation , 462 N.W.2d 147 (N.D. 1990)
Boehler v. Backes , 461 N.W.2d 103 (N.D. 1990)
Nichols v. Backes , 461 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1990)
Wolf v. ND Highway Commissioner , 458 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 1990)
Keepseagle v. Backes , 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D. 1990)
Fasching v. Backes , 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990)
Old Broadway Corporation v. Backes , 450 N.W.2d 734 (N.D. 1990)
Heinrich v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 449 N.W.2d 587 (N.D. 1989)
Geiger v. Backes , 444 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1989)
Lubenow v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 438 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1989)
Evans v. Backes , 437 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1989)
Holte v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989)
Greaves v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 432 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1988)
F-M Asphalt v. North Dakota Highway Department , 430 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1988)
Bickler v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988)
Bower v. State Highway Commissioner , 422 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1988)
Williams v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 417 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1987)
Salter v. Hjelle , 415 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1987)
Wibben v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 413 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1987)
Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle , 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987)
Old Broadway Corp. v. Hjelle , 411 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1987)
Brandt v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 409 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1987)
Langer v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 409 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1987)
Powell v. Hjelle , 408 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 1987)
Kahl v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 408 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1987)
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner , 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987)
Lund v. ND Highway Department , 403 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1987)
Lorenzen v. State Highway Commissioner , 401 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1987)
Thornton v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 399 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1987)
Holen v. Hjelle , 396 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1986)
Geiger v. Hjelle , 396 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1986)
Zietz v. Hjelle , 395 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1986)
Berger v. State Highway Commissioner , 394 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1986)
Walter v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 391 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1986)
Neset v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 388 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1986)
Schense v. Hjelle , 386 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1986)
F-M Asphalt, Inc. v. North Dakota State Highway Department , 384 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1986)
Schirado v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 382 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1986)
Moser v. North Dakota Highway Commissioner , 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1985)
Sorenson v. Liffrig , 359 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1984)
Kobilansky v. Liffrig , 358 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1984)
Dodds v. State Highway Commissioner , 354 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1984)
Buzick v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 351 N.W.2d 438 (N.D. 1984)
Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle , 317 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Silkman , 317 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1982)
Hammeren v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 315 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1982)
State, ex rel. Hjelle v. A 1973 Brockway Tractor , 299 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1980)
Andre v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 295 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1980)
Asbridge v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner , 291 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1980)
Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle , 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978)
Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Department , 262 N.W.2d 726 (N.D. 1978)
Clairmont v. Hjelle , 234 N.W.2d 13 (N.D. 1975)
Witte v. Hjelle , 234 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1975)
Lund v. Hjelle , 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1974)
Gableman v. Hjelle , 224 N.W.2d 379 (N.D. 1974)
Agnew v. Hjelle , 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974)
Cox v. Hjelle , 207 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1973)
Keller v. Paris , 207 N.W.2d 239 (N.D. 1973)
Smestad v. Ellingson , 191 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1971)
Borman v. Tschida , 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969)
O'Connell v. Hjelle , 143 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1966)
Hjelle v. J.C. Snyder & Sons , 133 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1965)
Newman v. Hjelle , 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1965)

Generated from Supreme Court Docket on 07/25/2008