B.L.L. v. W.D.C.
, 2008 ND 107,
750 N.W.2d 466
Whether a child has been abandoned is a question of fact.
Non-custodial parents abandon their children if they fail, without justifiable cause, to communicate with the child or to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law.
While imprisonment alone is not sufficient to constitute intentional abandonment, imprisonment when combined with other factors, such as parental neglect and withholding parental affection, may support a finding that the parent had relinquished all
parental claims and thereby abandoned the child.
Interest of C.J., S.J., and K.W.
, 2008 ND 81,
Interest of I.B.A. and C.B.A.
, 2008 ND 89,
748 N.W.2d 688
While there is no constitutional right to appear at the hearing, a parent must be represented by counsel at a hearing to terminate parental rights, absent a valid waiver of counsel.
A district court should make in-depth individual findings regarding each parent, rather than combining the parents together in its analysis of whether the children are deprived and whether deprivation is likely to continue.
Interest of J.S.
, 2008 ND 9,
743 N.W.2d 808
Interest of J.C.
, 2007 ND 111,
736 N.W.2d 451
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a juvenile court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is addressed to the court's discretion.
A juvenile court may not declare a parent in default and terminate parental rights without some evidentiary basis in the record to support the termination.
Interest of D.C.S.H.C.
, 2007 ND 102,
733 N.W.2d 902
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
A prisoner's due process rights are generally satisfied if the prisoner is represented at a parental-rights-termination hearing by counsel and has an opportunity to appear by deposition or other discovery technique.
In general, there is no denial of due process when the parent testifies at a termination hearing by telephone and is represented by court-appointed counsel during the proceeding.
A North Dakota district court does not have authority to order another state to allow a prisoner to appear in a civil case.
Interest of C.R., a child
, 2007 ND 95,
734 N.W.2d 342
Order terminating parental rights summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of A.S. and N.S.
, 2007 ND 83,
733 N.W.2d 232
The particular facts and circumstances of each case are considered when reviewing a juvenile court's decision on a motion for continuance because there is not a mechanical test to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.
The juvenile court's decision to terminate parental rights is a question of fact that will not be overturned unless the decision is clearly erroneous.
To prevent or eliminate the need for removing a child from its home and to make it possible for a child to return safely to its home, reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families must be made before the placement of a child in foster care.
Interest of L.J. and G.J.
,
734 N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 2007)
An order terminating a father's parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (7).
Interest of D.M., a child
, 2007 ND 62,
730 N.W.2d 604
A lower court's decision to terminate parental rights is a question of fact that will not be overturned unless the decision is clearly erroneous.
A finding that someone "has issues" or "struggled with issues" is meaningless as a matter of law.
When there has been an extensive period during which efforts have been made to overcome a parent's inabilities to effectively parent, the courts cannot allow the children to remain in this indeterminate status midway between foster care and the
obvious need for permanent placement.
A history of alcohol and drug abuse combined with numerous failed attempts at controlling the addiction, together with evidence of a failure to fully cooperate with social service workers to receive the necessary treatment and services to become a
fit parent, demonstrates a very poor prognosis for a parent's ability to provide minimally adequate care for a child.
When the mental and physical health of a child are the concerns, it is not enough that a parent indicate a desire to improve. A parent must be able to demonstrate present capability, or capability within the near future, to be an adequate parent.
Interest of K.S.
, 2006 ND 199,
725 N.W.2d 588
Order terminating parental rights summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of T.A.
, 2006 ND 210,
722 N.W.2d 548
To terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is a deprived child, (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied, and (3) that
by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
To prove deprivation is likely to continue or will not be remedied, the petitioner cannot rely on past deprivation alone, but must provide prognostic evidence, demonstrating the deprivation will continue.
Interest of E.G.
, 2006 ND 126,
716 N.W.2d 469
To terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is a deprived child, (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied, and (3) that
by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
To prove deprivation is likely to continue or will not be remedied, the petitioner cannot rely on past deprivation alone, but must provide prognostic evidence, demonstrating the deprivation will continue.
Interest of F.F.
, 2006 ND 47,
711 N.W.2d 144
A court may terminate parental rights on finding the child (1) is deprived and (2) has been in foster care for at least four hundred fifty of the previous six hundred sixty nights.
Interest of M.B.
, 2006 ND 19,
709 N.W.2d 11
To terminate parental rights, the petitioner must provide specific facts that will be relied on to terminate the parent's rights so the parent has notice and is able to meaningfully prepare a defense.
To terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is a deprived child, (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied, and (3) that
by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
To prove deprivation is likely to continue or will not be remedied, the petitioner cannot rely on past deprivation alone, but must provide prognostic evidence, demonstrating the deprivation will continue.
Interest of E.I., Jr.
, 2005 ND 185,
709 N.W.2d 21
A judgment terminating parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of C.R. and S.R.
, 2005 ND 181,
709 N.W.2d 21
An order terminating parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of L.J.
, 2005 ND 182,
709 N.W.2d 21
An order terminating parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).
Interest of B.J.K.
, 2005 ND 138,
701 N.W.2d 924
A juvenile court's finding of deprivation will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.
In determining whether the causes and conditions of deprivation will continue or will not be remedied, there must be prognostic evidence forming the basis for reasonable prediction of continued or future deprivation.
Interest of K.N.H.
, 2005 ND App 9,
704 N.W.2d 573
A juvenile court order terminating a father's parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of A.K.
, 2005 ND App 3,
696 N.W.2d 160
The State must prove the elements for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.
In determining whether the causes and conditions of deprivation will continue or will not be remedied, there must be prognostic evidence forming the basis for reasonable prediction of continued or future deprivation.
Interest of B.M.
, 2005 ND 78,
704 N.W.2d 286
A judgment terminating parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).
Interest of E.R.
, 2004 ND 202,
688 N.W.2d 384
Although incarceration, by itself, does not establish abandonment of a child for purposes of terminating parental rights, a probability of harm to the child may be established by prognostic evidence that a parent's current inability to care for the
child will continue long enough to render improbable the successful assimilation of the child into a family if the parent's rights are not terminated.
Interest of T.F.
, 2004 ND 126,
681 N.W.2d 786
Under federal law, termination of parental rights to an Indian child requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
Incarceration of a parent, by itself, does not establish abandonment of a child for purposes of terminating parental rights.
A probability of serious mental and emotional harm to the child may be established from a parent's current inability to properly care for the child.
Interest of T.J.L.
, 2004 ND 142,
682 N.W.2d 735
Effective March 1, 2004, findings of fact in juvenile matters will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
When there has been an extensive period in which efforts have been made to overcome a parent's inabilities to effectively parent, courts cannot allow the child to remain in an indeterminate status midway between foster care and the obvious need for
permanent placement.
Interest of A.B.
, 2003 ND 98,
663 N.W.2d 625
A juvenile court does not reversibly err in reversing a judicial referee's recommendation where the record before the juvenile court includes the undisputed factual matters necessary for resolution of the case and the issues involved in the case are
legal issues.
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, good cause not to transfer a child custody proceeding to tribal court exists if the proceeding is at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer is received, or if the evidence to decide the case cannot be
adequately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or the witnesses.
The Indian Child Welfare Act does not violate the substantive due process rights or equal protection rights of an Indian child.
Interest of B.N. & K.K.
, 2003 ND 68,
660 N.W.2d 610
The probability of serious mental and emotional harm to a child may be established by prognostic evidence that a parent's current inability to properly care for the child will continue long enough to render improbable the successful assimilation of
the child into a family if the parent's rights are not terminated.
Interest of K.S. and A.S.
, 2002 ND 164,
652 N.W.2d 341
To terminate parental rights under N.D.C.C. 27-20-44(1)(b)(1), the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is a deprived child; (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue; and (3) the
child is suffering, or will probably suffer, serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
Interest of T.J.R.
, 2002 ND 90,
647 N.W.2d 706
Termination of parental rights is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
Interest of D.R.
, 2001 ND 183,
636 N.W.2d 412
In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the court can give substantial credence to evidence indicating a pattern of conduct by a parent that forms a basis for reasonable prediction the deprivation of the child is likely to continue and
result in serious physical, mental, or emotional harm.
Interest of N.H.
, 2001 ND 143,
632 N.W.2d 451
Prognostic evidence is a basis for reasonable predictions about future behavior when determining whether a child's deprivation is likely to continue or will not be remedied. Prognostic evidence includes reports and opinions of professionals.
Lack of parental cooperation with social service agencies is insufficient to establish deprivation but is pertinent to whether deprivation will continue.
Interest of R.O.
, 2001 ND 137,
631 N.W.2d 159
In a parental-rights-termination proceeding alleging reports of child abuse or neglect, N.D.C.C. 50-25.1-10 abrogates the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privilege in N.D.R.Ev. 503.
Constitutional issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Under federal law, upon a finding of good cause, a trial court may order disclosure of information about a person's alcohol or drug treatment at a federally assisted facility, but the court must restrict disclosure to essential matters.
Interest of P.M.
, 2001 ND 129,
636 N.W.2d 674
Juvenile court's order terminating parental rights summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
Interest of T.K.
, 2001 ND 127,
630 N.W.2d 38
Parents' fundamental and natural rights to their children are of constitutional dimension, but they are not absolute, and parents must at least provide care to their children that satisfies the minimum community standards.
When the mental and physical health of a child are the concerns, it is not enough that a mother indicates a desire to improve, and her failure to cooperate with social service assistance programs is a relevant factor in terminating parental rights.
Interest of C.R.C.
, 2001 ND 83,
625 N.W.2d 533
Termination of parental rights is appropriate when the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that a child is deprived and the deprivation is not due primarily to a lack of financial resources; the causes and conditions of the deprivation will
likely continue or will not be remedied; and the child is suffering, or will probably suffer, serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm from the deprivation.
Interest of M.S.
, 2001 ND 68,
624 N.W.2d 678
To terminate the parental rights for an Indian child, the Indian Child Welfare Act requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.
To terminate parental rights for an Indian child, the Indian Child Welfare Act requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that there were active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family and those efforts were unsuccessful.
When cultural bias is not implicated in parental termination proceedings, the requirement of qualified expert witness testimony under the Indian Child Welfare Act can be met with testimony of a professional person having substantial education and
experience in the area of his or her speciality even though that professional does not have specific experience or knowledge of Indian customs, tradition, or culture.
Interest of D.N., D.N., C.N., Children
, 2001 ND 71,
624 N.W.2d 686
When there has been an extensive period in which efforts have been made to overcome inabilities to effectively parent, the courts cannot allow the children to remain in an indeterminative status midway between foster care and the obvious need for
permanent placement.
Interest of A.L. and J.L.
, 2001 ND 59,
623 N.W.2d 418
Counsel's unsupported statements about children's potential eligibility for enrollment in a particular Indian tribe and other unknown Indian tribes are insufficient to trigger provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act that require notice of
termination proceedings to an Indian child's tribe.
Evidence of past deprivation alone is not enough to terminate parental rights, and prognostic evidence is necessary to determine continued or future deprivation.
Interest of C.R.H.
, 2000 ND 222,
620 N.W.2d 175
In terminating parental rights under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20 the trial court has no authority to make the termination contingent on the terminated parents receiving visitation rights upon the child's adoption.
Interest of W.E.
, 2000 ND 208,
619 N.W.2d 494
To terminate parental rights, a three-part test must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to continue; and (3) the child is suffering or will suffer serious
physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
Review of a termination proceeding is similar to a trial de novo, with appreciable weight afforded to the juvenile court's decision.
Interest of S.F.
, 2000 ND 161,
615 N.W.2d 511
Parental rights will be terminated if: 1) the child is deprived; 2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue; and 3) the child is suffering, or will in the future probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or
emotional harm.
In determining the likelihood of continuing deprivation, a court may consider parental cooperation with social service agencies.
Interest of A.R.
, 2000 ND 130,
612 N.W.2d 569
In an appeal from an order of the juvenile court, review is not limited to determining whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous, but the findings are given appreciable weight.
When an evidentiary hearing has been held, it is the appellant's duty to order a transcript. An appellant assumes the consequences and the risk for the failure to file a complete transcript.
Interest of D.F.G. and E.K.B.
, 1999 ND 216,
602 N.W.2d 697
On appeal, a juvenile court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed in a manner similar to trial de novo, giving deference to the juvenile court decision.
A juvenile court's decision to terminate parental rights will be affirmed when the State proves by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the child is deprived, (2) the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue, and (3) the child
is suffering or the child will in the future probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.
In the Interest of C.R., a Minor Child
, 1999 ND 221,
602 N.W.2d 520
Although incarceration, by itself, does not establish abandonment of a child for purposes of terminating parental rights, the probability of serious mental or emotional harm to the child may be established by prognostic evidence the parent's current
inability to care for the child will continue long enough to render improbable the successful assimilation of the child into a family if the parent's rights are not terminated.
Interest of Z.R. and J.V., Children
, 1999 ND 214,
602 N.W.2d 723
To terminate the parental rights of a deprived child, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue and the child is suffering or in the future will suffer serious physical,
mental, moral, or emotional harm.
Although review of parental termination is de novo, the appellate court will give appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court.
Interest of A.M.
, 1999 ND 195,
601 N.W.2d 253
N.D.C.C. 27-20-44(1)(b) (1969) creates a three-part test for terminating parental rights: 1) Is the child deprived? 2) Are the conditions and causes of the deprivation likely to continue? 3) Is the child suffering, or will the child in the future
probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm?
Interest of A.S.
, 1998 ND 181,
584 N.W.2d 853
The Supreme Court reviews a juvenile court's decision
to terminate parental rights in a manner similar to
trial de novo, giving deference to the juvenile court
decision.
N.D.C.C. 27-20-44(1)(b) creates a three-part test for
termination of parental rights: (1) Is the child
deprived? (2) Are the conditions and causes of the
deprivation likely to continue? (3) Is the child
suffering, or will the child in the future probably
suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional
harm?
Where the State proves these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, the juvenile court's decision to
terminate parental rights is affirmed.
Interest of L.F. and J.F.
, 1998 ND 129,
580 N.W.2d 573
The Supreme Court reviews a juvenile court's decision to
terminate parental rights in a manner similar to a trial de novo.
N.D.C.C. 27-20-44(1)(b) creates a three-part test to determine
whether a juvenile court may terminate parental rights: 1) Is
the child deprived? 2) Are the conditions and causes of the
deprivation likely to continue? 3) Is the child suffering, or
will the child in the future probably suffer, serious physical,
mental, moral, or emotional harm?
Where clear and convincing evidence in the record affirmatively
proves these elements, the juvenile court's decision terminating
parental rights is affirmed.
Novak v. J.L.D.
,
539 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1995)
Interest of D.R.
,
525 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 1994)
Braaten v. R.G.
,
506 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1993)
Adoption of K.A.S.
,
499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993)
D.L.D. v. ND Dept. of Human Services
,
495 N.W.2d 299 (N.D. 1993)
Sprynczynatyk v. Celley
,
486 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1992)
Interest of J.H. AND A.H.
,
484 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1992)
Interest of D.R.
,
463 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1990)
Interest of T.J.O.
,
462 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1990)
Interest of C.K.H.
,
458 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 1990)
Interest of M.M.S.
,
449 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1989)
State ex rel. Niess v. Zillmer
,
449 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1989)
Interest of M.D.K.
,
447 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 1989)
Adoption of K.S.H.
,
442 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1989)
Heitkamp v. L.J.
,
436 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1989)
Jacobson v. J.A.L.
,
432 N.W.2d 876 (N.D. 1988)
Interest of A.M.C.
,
391 N.W.2d 178 (N.D. 1986)
Interest of L.D.R.T.
,
391 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1986)
Interest of V.J.R.
,
387 N.W.2d 499 (N.D. 1986)
Interest of J.K.S.
,
356 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1984)
Interest of J.E.H. & C.L.H., Jr.
,
355 N.W.2d 828 (N.D. 1984)
Interest of J.S. & J.T.S.
,
351 N.W.2d 440 (N.D. 1984)
Interest of J.J.H.
,
343 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1984)
Asendorf v. M.S.S.
,
342 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1983)
Interest of K.L.
,
338 N.W.2d 834 (N.D. 1983)
Interest of B.M.
,
335 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1983)
Interest of M.R.
,
334 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1983)
Interest of D.S.
,
325 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1982)
Interest of J.N.R.
,
322 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982)
Interest of R.A.S.
,
321 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1982)
Interest of L.N.
,
319 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1982)
Interest of A.C.
,
317 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1982)
Kleingartner v. D.P.A.B.
,
310 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1981)
Interest of M.N.
,
294 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1980)
Interest of D.R.J.
,
295 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1980)
Interest of R.H.
,
289 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1980)
Interest of M.M.C.
,
277 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1979)
Interest of J.K.S.
,
274 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1979)
Interest of K.P.
,
267 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1978)
Interest of R.H.
,
262 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1978)
Interest of R.D.S.
,
259 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1977)
Interest of R. L. D.
,
253 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1977)
Interest of K.B.
,
248 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976)
Bjerke v. D.T.
,
248 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976)
Interest of K.B.
,
244 N.W.2d 297 (N.D. 1976)
Interest of D.G., a child
,
246 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 1976)
Interest of R.W.B.
,
241 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1976)
In re H.
,
206 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1973)
Interest of A.N.
,
201 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1972)
Interest of J.Z.
,
190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971)
Matter of J.V.
,
185 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1971)