Dui/Dus

City of Devils Lake v. Grove , 2008 ND 155,
If an investigative detention lasts too long or its manner of execution unreasonably infringes an individual's Fourth Amendment interests, it may no longer be justified as an investigative stop and, as a full-fledged seizure, must be supported by probable cause.
To determine whether an investigative detention has become a de facto arrest, this Court considers whether the invasion of an individual's Fourth Amendment interests is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.
Officers are obligated to limit investigative methods employed during a traffic stop to the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.
State v. Gill , 2008 ND 152,
The scope of the community caretaking function does not extend to include officers' entry into private residences.
The warrantless entry of law enforcement officers into a home presents a Fourth Amendment issue and should not be examined under the community caretaking doctrine.
State v. Huber , 2008 ND 122,
Criminal judgments for DUI and DUS are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (7).
State v. Schwab , 2008 ND 94, 748 N.W.2d 696
Once a blood alcohol test report is admitted into evidence, a court abuses its discretion by refusing to permit a DUI defendant to examine the analyst who performed the chemical testing, if the analyst is present at court.
City of Fargo v. Levine , 2008 ND 64, 747 N.W.2d 130
The government will be ordered to produce source code for the Intoxilyzer only if the defendant establishes that the code is material and that the code is within the possession, custody, or control of the government.
City of Minot v. Keller , 2008 ND 38, 745 N.W.2d 638
For reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, officer to officer communications are presumptively reliable.
State v. Larson , 2007 ND 21, 747 N.W.2d 136
A district court order dismissing a DUI criminal complaint is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).
State v. Emery , 2008 ND 3, 743 N.W.2d 815
Ordering the surrender of license plates does not fit the maximum penalty for a first DUI offense.
A DUI conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty of a subsequent DUI conviction when there is no proof that the defendant waived his right to counsel before pleading guilty to the earlier DUI charge.
City of Grand Forks v. Mitchell , 2008 ND 5, 743 N.W.2d 800
A police officer's stop of a vehicle bearing no license plates with a white 8 Ť x 11 sheet of paper with a date written in black marker posted in its rear window that the officer did not recognize as an authentic temporary registration certificate was constitutionally permissible because the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation of the motor vehicle registration law.
A police officer's subjective intent is not germane for purposes of the objective inquiry used to determine whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed that an individual was violating the law.
State v. Skarsgard , 2007 ND 174, 742 N.W.2d 839
Criminal judgments for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a suspended license are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3), (4), and (7).
State v. Skarsgard , 2007 ND 160, 739 N.W.2d 786
A law enforcement officer may make an investigative stop of a vehicle if the officer has at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the law or probable cause to believe the motorist has done so.
When a law enforcement officer observes a vehicle with no license plates and no viewable registration certificate, the officer has reasonable grounds to stop the driver and check if the driver has a valid certificate in his possession.
An adequate foundation for admission of blood-alcohol test results may be established by the testimony of witnesses.
A jury is generally presumed to follow instructions, and a curative instruction to disregard certain evidence is generally sufficient to remove improper prejudice.
Generally, pretrial bail issues are moot after conviction.
Reversal of a conviction and release from confinement is not a remedy for allegations of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Appellate review of a criminal sentence focuses only on whether the district court acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor.
State v. Skarsgard , 2007 ND 159, 740 N.W.2d 64
The criminal code definition of "offense" as "conduct for which a term of imprisonment or fine is authorized under statute after conviction" applies to driving violations under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 and 39-06-42.
Judgments for driving under the influence and driving under suspension which are on appeal are "offenses" that can be used to enhance subsequent driving under the influence and driving under suspension judgments.
State v. Fasteen , 2007 ND 162, 740 N.W.2d 60
Under the Terry doctrine, a law enforcement officer can make an investigative stop of a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the motorist has violated or is violating the law.
Under N.D.C.C. 39-10-38(1), no person may turn a vehicle right or left upon a roadway without giving an appropriate signal and unless or until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
State v. Demars , 2007 ND 145, 738 N.W.2d 486
Denial of a motion to suppress evidence will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the court's findings, and if its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
State v. Hahne , 2007 ND 116, 736 N.W.2d 483
A Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped by police at a checkpoint. The basic question is whether the seizure is reasonable. If the seizure is reasonable, then it is constitutional.
Temporary law enforcement checkpoints or roadblocks established for particular public purposes are, in general, constitutional.
A court applies a three-part test to analyze the reasonableness of a law enforcement checkpoint: (1) a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure; (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest; and (3) the severity of the interference with individual liberty.
Law enforcement checkpoints need not, as a matter of law, provide motorists with a way to avoid them. When considering the constitutional reasonableness of a checkpoint, avoidability is one factor that may be considered in evaluating the intrusion on the personal liberty of individual motorists.
State v. Friedt , 2007 ND 108, 735 N.W.2d 848
On appeal, a constitutional question will not be decided if the dispute can be resolved on other grounds.
A trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion.
An adequate foundation may be established by testimony that identifies the evidence and establishes the competency, materiality, and relevancy of the evidence.
State v. Paul , 2007 ND 76, 734 N.W.2d 342
A district court's judgment for driving while under suspension and an order granting the State's motion in limine are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
State v. Westmiller , 2007 ND 52, 730 N.W.2d 134
Although reasonable suspicion is the minimum quantum of evidence required for an investigatory traffic stop, a stop may be upheld on the basis of probable cause if that evidentiary standard has been satisfied.
Traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and therefore provide officers with the basis for an investigatory stops.
City of West Fargo v. Olson , 2006 ND 48, 734 N.W.2d 342
A conviction for driving under the influence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1).
State v. Bachmeier , 2007 ND 42, 729 N.W.2d 141
Observed traffic violations provide law enforcement officers with the basis for a stop.
The exclusionary rule is only designed to safeguard an individual's rights through its deterrent effect, and it is not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
North Dakota law authorizes law enforcement personnel operating a class A emergency vehicle to exceed the posted speed limit to pursue a suspected violator, so long as it can be done without danger to life or property.
State v. Jackson , 2006 ND 200, 725 N.W.2d 588
Conviction of driving under suspension summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (4).
City of Bismarck v. Perusquia , 2006 ND 207, 725 N.W.2d 588
A conviction for driving under the influence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
State v. Salveson , 2006 ND 169, 719 N.W.2d 747
A trial court is allowed the widest range of discretion in criminal sentencing.
Multiple class A misdemeanor offenses may be deemed by the sentencing court to involve substantially different criminal objectives if they do not fall under one of the following three categories: (1) one offense is an included offense of the other; (2) one offense consists of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, or other form of preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the other; or (3) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.
The crimes of aggravated reckless driving and driving while under the influence constitute two crimes with substantially different criminal objectives.
City of Fargo v. Curtis , 2006 ND 128, 719 N.W.2d 759
A criminal judgment entered after a jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol and operating a motor vehicle without liability insurance is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
State v. Ehli , 2006 ND 140, 717 N.W.2d 601
State's appeal of order suppressing evidence will be dismissed as moot when the underlying cases had been dismissed on a motion by the State.
State v. Pace , 2006 ND 98, 713 N.W.2d 535
A driving-under-the-influence arrestee being asked to submit to a chemical test is, upon request, entitled to a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer before deciding whether to take the test.
The reasonableness of the opportunity to consult with a lawyer before taking a chemical test for DUI is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
A law enforcement officer need not offer other suggestions to a DUI arrestee who is unable to reach his lawyer and makes no further requests.
City of Minot v. Hellebust , 2006 ND 91, 719 N.W.2d 384
A criminal judgment after conviction by a jury of driving under the influence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (4).
City of Lisbon v. Dahl , 2006 ND 90, 719 N.W.2d 384
A criminal judgment for driving under the influence of liquor or drugs is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
State v. Moran , 2006 ND 62, 711 N.W.2d 915
Four factors must be weighted to decide whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused.
The State must actively try to serve a warrant, or it risks being negligent for not diligently pursuing the accused.
When the State diligently pursues the defendant, the defendant must prove actual prejudice; when the State intentionally delays prosecution because of a bad-faith motive, prejudice is presumed; and when the State has been negligent by not diligently pursuing the defendant, the weight of the other factors and the length of the delay controls whether prejudice must be actual or may be presumed.
The State does not err in its closing argument when it does not refer to its burden of proof so long as it does not imply a lesser burden of proof.
State v. Klein , 2006 ND 37, 711 N.W.2d 606
Conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (3).
City of Bismarck v. Judkins , 2005 ND 143, 701 N.W.2d 911
A constitutional error may be declared harmless if the court, after reviewing the entire record, is convinced that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
State v. Jackson , 2005 ND 121, 704 N.W.2d 573
Driving under suspension conviction is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2),(3), and (7).
State v. Smith , 2005 ND App 5, 697 N.W.2d 368
The enhanced sentencing language of N.D.C.C. 39-08-01.2(2), requiring at least 90 days incarceration, is invalid and unenforceable when sentencing a defendant found guilty of a class B misdemeanor DUI under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01.
City of Grand Forks v. Barnum , 2005 ND App 4, 697 N.W.2d 7
For a process to be a necessary part of the approved method, the State Toxicologist must expressly include it in the approved methodology and make it a part of the requirement for fair administration.
Admission of a checklist other than the one generated in the course of administering a breath test is not a foundational requirement for admissibility of the test result generated in a breath test conducted with an Intoxilyzer 5000 KB-EP and printed on a "Form 106 KB-EP."
State v. Thompson , 2005 ND 88, 704 N.W.2d 286
An appeal from an order denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1), (7).
City of Grand Forks v. Scialdone , 2005 ND 24, 691 N.W.2d 198
Evidence about calibration checks when an Intoxilyzer has been moved is not a foundational requirement for showing an Intoxilyzer test was administered in accordance with the approved method for conducting the test or for admission of the test result into evidence.
If a defendant rebuts the prosecution's prima facie showing of fair administration of a blood-alcohol test for admission into evidence, the prosecution may present testimony to show fair administration despite defendant's rebuttal.
A judgment will not ordinarily be reversed on appeal for surprise when no request is made for a continuance at the time and there is no showing of inability to meet the situation.
City of Bismarck v. Bosch , 2005 ND 12, 691 N.W.2d 260
For a filed document or process to be a necessary part of the approved method for conducting an Intoxilyzer test, the State Toxicologist must expressly include it in the approved method and make it a part of the requirement for fair administration.
Proof that the standard solution used for Intoxilyzer tests has not been used more than 50 times is not part of the approved method.
State v. Jackson , 2005 ND 14, 691 N.W.2d 250
The distance an officer follows a vehicle does not abrogate a legally legitimate basis for a traffic stop.
City of Wahpeton v. Timmerman , 2004 ND 175, 687 N.W.2d 253
Convictions of driving without a license and resisting arrest and subsequent denials of motions to dismiss charges and withdraw guilty pleas are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1), (2) and (4).
State v. Mikkelson , 2004 ND 121, 688 N.W.2d 402
Driving under suspension conviction is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
State v. Knowels , 2003 ND 180, 671 N.W.2d 816
North Dakota law does not require a chemical test to convict a person of driving while under the influence of alcohol. A conviction may be sustained when evidence of defendant's intoxication is shown through witness testimony of defendant's intoxication, based on their observations of defendant.
State v. Schwab , 2003 ND 119, 665 N.W.2d 52
Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 3(b), amendment of a complaint is within the district court's discretion.
On appeal, a trial court's jury selection process is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.
A potential juror's acquaintance with a possible witness is not implied bias.
In a fair-cross-section challenge, a defendant must show the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community, the representation of the group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and the group was systematically excluded in the jury selection process.
City of Devils Lake v. Alford , 2003 ND 56, 664 N.W.2d 516
Denial of a motion to suppress evidence is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4).
City of Grand Forks v. Ramstad , 2003 ND 41, 658 N.W.2d 731
To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show the prosecution withheld evidence which was favorable to him.
A defendant alleging a Brady violation must show he could not have obtained the undisclosed evidence with reasonable diligence.
Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, the prosecution has a duty to provide documents in the possession of the State Toxicologist's office, even if the defendant could have otherwise obtained the documents himself.
State v. Rohde , 2002 ND 169, 655 N.W.2d 84
Appeal from a conviction for driving under suspension or revocation, driving without liability insurance, and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1).
State v. Fitterer , 2002 ND 170, 652 N.W.2d 908
Moving papers for a motion to suppress evidence require neither exceptional particularity nor supporting affidavits or other evidence, but must provide adequate notice to the trial court and the prosecution of the issues being raised.
At a motion to suppress hearing, the initial burden is the defendant's to show a prima facie case.
State v. Stewart , 2002 ND 102, 646 N.W.2d 712
Under N.D.R.Ev. 609(a)(i), for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a testifying accused, evidence that the accused has been convicted of a felony that meets the time limit of subdivision (b) must be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting that evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Among the factors for a trial court to consider in weighing the probative value of a prior felony conviction and its prejudicial effect are impeachment value of the prior crime, the time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent history, similarity between the prior crime and the charged crime, importance of the defendant's testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue.
City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence , 2002 ND 31, 639 N.W.2d 466
An officer's reasonable and articulable suspicion that an individual has committed the offense of disorderly conduct is sufficient to justify a temporary detention of that individual for investigative purposes.
City of Jamestown v. Jerome , 2002 ND 34, 639 N.W.2d 478
A police officer is not fulfilling a community caretaking function when approaching a person under circumstances where it is obvious the person is neither in need of nor desires assistance.
Not all communications between law enforcement officers and citizens involve seizures implicating Fourth Amendment rights. A seizure within the context of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.
City of Fargo v. Tipler , 2002 ND 8, 638 N.W.2d 45
Juries do not have a right to decide a case contrary to law or fact, but instead, must accept the law from the trial court and apply the law to the facts.
State v. Barth , 2001 ND 201, 637 N.W.2d 369
A trial court has broad discretion in selecting a method to impanel a jury, if it permits the defendant to exercise peremptory challenges without embarrassment and does not intimidate him from exercising them.
A person is guilty of preventing an arrest if, with intent to prevent a public servant from effecting an arrest, he creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or to anyone else except himself, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome resistance to making the arrest.
State v. Lynch , 2001 ND 173, 635 N.W.2d 164
The introduction of the state toxicologist's list of approved designations medically qualified to draw blood is a foundational requirement for the introduction of blood test results.
State v. Gleeson , 2001 ND 164, 639 N.W.2d 706
Conviction for driving under suspension based on a jury verdict is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
City of Fargo v. Gullekson , 2001 ND 165, 634 N.W.2d 525
If the police have reasonable and articulable suspicion a vehicle is owned by a driver whose license is suspended, and have reasonable and articulable suspicion the owner was driving the vehicle, an investigatory stop could be made to determine if the crime of driving with a suspended license is being committed.
City of West Fargo v. Ross , 2001 ND 163, 634 N.W.2d 527
If the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion a certain moving vehicle belongs to a driver whose license is suspended, and the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion the owner was driving the vehicle, an investigatory stop can be made to determine if the crime of driving with a suspended license is being committed.
State v. Schneeweiss , 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2d 482
Defendants have the right to court-appointed counsel at public expense in all felony cases and in all non-felony cases, unless the sentence upon conviction will not include imprisonment, only if they are eligible under the guidelines governing indigency.
Non-indigent defendants also have the right to court-appointed counsel, at their own expense, if they are unable to secure the assistance of counsel.
A trial court has discretion to substitute appointed counsel if a defendant shows good cause for the substitution.
A trial court has discretion to determine whether to grant a continuance of trial to change counsel and may consider the time required for trial preparation and the diligence of the moving party.
Defendants may voluntarily waive their right to counsel, or their conduct may be the functional equivalent of a voluntary waiver, but the waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently.
State v. Jensen , 2001 ND 117, 636 N.W.2d 674
Criminal convictions for driving under revocation, driving under the influence, and false report to law enforcement summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (4).
State v. Knudson , 2001 ND 49, 625 N.W.2d 264
The trial court's denial of a motion to suppress and its judgment of conviction for driving under suspension are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(7).
State v. Berger , 2001 ND 44, 623 N.W.2d 25
Absent actual prejudice, violation of the statutory right to consult with counsel before submitting to an Intoxilyzer test is properly challenged by a motion to suppress the results of the test, rather than a motion to dismiss the charge.
A defendant must be provided a reasonable opportunity to make long distance telephone calls to consult with an attorney, if the defendant pays for the call and it does not interfere with valid testing.
State v. Nowik , 2000 ND App 1, 624 N.W.2d 351
The appellant's conviction for driving a vehicle with a suspended license is summarily affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
No person has a constitutional right to operate a motor vehicle on the roads of this state without a valid driver's license.
State v. Glass , 2000 ND 212, 620 N.W.2d 146
DUI is a strict liability offense for which a jury instruction on culpability is not required.
Failure to preserve an objection or make an offer of proof precludes a later assertion of error unless a defendant establishes obvious error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. Obvious error is recognized only with extreme caution.
State v. Gleeson , 2000 ND 205, 619 N.W.2d 858
When there is sufficient doubt concerning a defendant's competency, a trial court must on its own motion conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.
Inconsistent testimony at trial and confusion regarding administrative and criminal proceedings do not create a sufficient doubt of a defendant's competency so as to warrant a hearing on the issue.
State v. Loh , 2000 ND 188, 618 N.W.2d 477
An officer has probable cause justifying a vehicle stop, based on evidence of a traffic violation, which is not invalidated when an officer subjectively suspects another offense.
Following a vehicle for five miles before initiating an investigatory stop does not invalidate the probable cause justifying the vehicle stop.
City of Mandan v. Leno , 2000 ND 184, 618 N.W.2d 161
The limited statutory right of a person arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney attaches after arrest.
State v. Haverluk , 2000 ND 178, 617 N.W.2d 652
A law enforcement officer may conduct a limited search of a vehicle's interior if there is a reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer.
A law enforcement officer may search a vehicle's interior incident to a lawful arrest as long as the search is contemporaneous with the arrest. A search incident to arrest is not invalid simply because the search preceded the arrest as long as the arrest quickly followed the search and the fruits of the search were not needed for probable cause to arrest.
City of Fargo v. Hersch , 2000 ND 172, 622 N.W.2d 432
Judgment of conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).
City of West Fargo v. Hawkins , 2000 ND 168, 616 N.W.2d 856
Unless the date is an essential element of the offense, the prosecution need not prove the crime was committed on the precise date alleged in the complaint or information.
The date of the offense is not an element of the crime of driving under the influence.
When there is a deviation from the chain-of-custody procedure specified on Form 104 for submission of blood samples to the State Toxicologist, the blood test results are still admissible if the officer's testimony established proper chain of custody.
City of Fargo v. Egeberg , 2000 ND 159, 615 N.W.2d 542
Probable cause to arrest a driver for driving while under the influence of alcohol is established by signs of physical or mental impairment and reason to believe the driver's impairment is caused by alcohol.
State v. Norton , 2000 ND 153, 615 N.W.2d 531
The State's appeal from an order suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, must be accompanied by the statutorily required statement of the prosecuting attorney.
State v. Martin , 2000 ND 121, 611 N.W.2d 896
A county satisfies the randomness requirement of North Dakota's Jury Selection Plan if it randomly selects a jury pool and takes jury panels from the list sequentially.
State v. Torgerson , 2000 ND 105, 611 N.W.2d 182
The limited record in this case does not establish a substantial failure to comply with jury selection procedures under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-09.1.
State v. Dobson , 2000 ND 66, 617 N.W.2d 131
D.U.I. and D.U.S. convictions summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
State v. Soum , 2000 ND 65, 617 N.W.2d 131
Judgment of conviction for driving while under suspension is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
State v. Sommer , 2000 ND 68, 617 N.W.2d 131
D.U.I. conviction summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (7).
City of Jamestown v. Neumiller , 2000 ND 11, 604 N.W.2d 441
A certified record from the Department of Transportation may be sufficient to raise the presumption "a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail."
A trial court's determination of whether a presumption was rebutted is a question of fact which will not be overturned if there is competent evidence to support it.
City of Minot v. Johnson , 1999 ND 241, 603 N.W.2d 485
An investigatory stop by a police officer must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion a crime was or is about to be committed.
Observation of an illegal activity constitutes probable cause to arrest, a higher standard than a reasonable suspicion.
An area's reputation for criminal activity is an articulable fact on which an officer may rely, but standing alone is not a reasonable and articulable suspicion a crime was or is about to be committed.
State v. Ulmer , 1999 ND 245, 603 N.W.2d 865
For purposes of imposing consecutive sentences, multiple offenses involve substantially different criminal objectives if they do not fall under one of the following three categories: 1) one offense is an included offense of the other; 2) one offense consists of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, or other form of preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the other; or 3) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.
City of Valley City v. Stuart , 1999 ND 210, 606 N.W.2d 137
Judgment of conviction summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
Including materials in an appendix that are not in the record violates N.D.R.App.P. 30(a), and may result in sanctions.
City of Bismarck v. Fettig , 1999 ND 193, 601 N.W.2d 247
Requiring a defendant in municipal court to request a jury trial does not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial.
When there is an irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, the more specific statute controls the general and the later enactment controls the earlier.
City of Fargo v. Erickson , 1999 ND 145, 598 N.W.2d 787
If probable cause for an arrest for driving under the influence is not an issue at trial, evidence of consent to take a preliminary breath test is irrelevant and inadmissible.
A nonconstitutional error is harmless if the erroneously admitted evidence was not prejudicial and did not affect the party's substantial rights.
City of Fargo v. Rockwell , 1999 ND 125, 597 N.W.2d 406
A defendant's continued requests for a new court-appointed attorney after the trial court clearly denied his initial request must be considered the functional equivalent of a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.
A defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel after being advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
There is no constitutional right to standby counsel.
City of West Fargo v. Stuart , 1999 ND 99, 598 N.W.2d 860
Conviction for driving while under suspension is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7).
State v. Mund , 1999 ND 90, 593 N.W.2d 760
Prior guilty pleas used for penalty enhancement may only be collaterally attacked based on validity of waiver of the right to counsel.
State v. Egan , 1999 ND 59, 591 N.W.2d 150
In a prosecution for driving under suspension, a driver who fails to notify the Department of Transportation of a change of address within ten days of moving may claim lack of receipt of notice of an opportunity for hearing on a license suspension when the notice is served within those ten days.
State v. Berger , 1999 ND 46, 590 N.W.2d 884
Once the reliability of a prior conviction is established by showing the defendant had counsel, the burden shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show the conviction was deficient under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.
Rule 11 does not require a defendant be informed that a guilty plea may be used to enhance a future sentence under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01.
City of Devils Lake v. Corrigan , 1999 ND 16, 589 N.W.2d 579
A court or magistrate may, but is not required to, set a traffic violation bond schedule under N.D.C.C. 29-08-02.
State v. Roberson , 1998 ND App 15, 586 N.W.2d 687
The testimony of law enforcement officers who said they observed the defendant in an intoxicated state and the testimony of a passing motorist who said he saw the defendant driving erratically and "staggering" after the accident was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant must show ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions from the face of the existing record to obtain relief.
State v. Rohde , 1998 ND App 13, 595 N.W.2d 603
Convictions for driving while under suspension and driving without liability insurance are summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (7).
State v. Garrett , 1998 ND 173, 584 N.W.2d 502
Where a law enforcement officer, with plain view of contraband on the front passenger seat of a vehicle in a public parking lot, could lawfully seize contraband on the scene, a subsequent search of the vehicle at the station is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
A reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop can be provided by reports from other officers, tips from informants, and from the stopping officer's own observations.
City of Bismarck v. Glass , 1998 ND App 1, 581 N.W.2d 474
Absent countervailing law enforcement interests, a police officer may not make a nonconsensual, no-knock warrantless entry into a house for an arrest or search.
City of Mandan v. Baer , 1998 ND 101, 578 N.W.2d 559
Criminal defendant is denied right to be present during stage of trial when district court erroneously excuses prospective juror during a recess in jury selection outside the presence of defendant and counsel.
Convicted felon may be challenged for bias, but cannot be excused solely on basis of conviction.
In harmless error analysis, burden of persuasion is on the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt a violation of presence requirement has not prejudiced defendant.
Supreme Court is not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt by speculative argument.
State v. Black Cloud , 1998 ND 81, 585 N.W.2d 581
DUI conviction summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1 (a)(3) and (4).
City of Bismarck v. Fischer , 1998 ND 79, 585 N.W.2d 581
DUI conviction summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1 (a)(4).
City of Fargo v. Bakkerud , 1998 ND 77, 576 N.W.2d 858
When a DUI arrestee requests an independent blood test, the arresting officer must afford the arrestee a reasonable opportunity to secure an independent test and must not prevent or hinder the arrestee's timely reasonable attempts to obtain a test.
Although the arresting officer told the arrestee independent blood tests were quite expensive, the arrestee was not deprived of his right to take an independent test, especially where the officers provided the arrestee with a telephone and phone book but the arrestee made no attempt to arrange for a test.
City of Fargo v. Ovind , 1998 ND 69, 575 N.W.2d 901
Police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a limited investigative stop of defendant in order to "freeze" the situation at the scene of a reported fight.
State v. Boline , 1998 ND 67, 575 N.W.2d 906
Police may stop a person in order to investigate an allegation of domestic violence if police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion domestic violence has occurred.
City of Dickinson v. Lindstrom , 1998 ND 52, 575 N.W.2d 440
Although the trial court's method of permitting "banking" of peremptory challenges was error, reversal was not mandated because the challenges were actually exercised in a manner consistent with N.D.R.Crim.P. 24(b), and N.D.C.C. 29-17-46.
State v. Albaugh , 1997 ND 229, 571 N.W.2d 345
The State has a compelling interest in managing and preserving the wildlife within its borders.
An appropriate game-and-fish checkpoint does not violate constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable seizures.
The ratio of violations discovered to total vehicles stopped is but one measure of a checkpoint's effectiveness, and the State's failure to tally the total number of vehicles stopped does not by itself render the checkpoint unconstitutional.
A game warden who observes open cans of beer in a vehicle stopped at a game-and-fish checkpoint has statutory authority to momentarily detain the driver until a nearby police officer on the checkpoint "team" can investigate further.
City of Fargo v. Rockwell , 1997 ND 217, 575 N.W.2d 224
DUI conviction summarily affirmed under NDRAppP 35.1(a) (3) & (4).
City of Fargo v. Sivertson , 1997 ND 204, 571 N.W.2d 137
A police officer's approach to the defendant's vehicle stopped in driving lane behind accident scene and knock on driver's window to determine whether the driver was okay and why the driver was not proceeding in the left lane with other traffic constituted a permissible caretaker encounter and not a Fourth Amendment stop.
Torstenson v. Moore , 1997 ND 159, 567 N.W.2d 622
Courts must review an agency's factual findings only on the evidentiary record of testimony and exhibits. A finding of fact by an agency's hearing officer that a street was wide enough so the driver did not have to cross the center line to avoid parked cars was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
City of Fargo v. Novotny , 1997 ND 73, 562 N.W.2d 95
The trial court's jury instructions concerning the actual physical control statute were a correct statement of the law under the facts of this case. The defendant's position in the driver's seat made him capable of operating the vehicle, and thus the law did not require the district court to instruct the jury that an intoxicated person's presence in a motor vehicle as a passenger does not constitute the offense.
City of Williston v. Hegstad , 1997 ND 56, 562 N.W.2d 91
Argument to the jury by counsel must be confined to facts in evidence and the proper inferences that flow therefrom. A prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, violates the defendant's right to due process. It is improper for a prosecuting attorney to vouch for the credibility of government witnesses in argument to the jury. Prosecutor's statement, in closing argument to the jury, that two testifying police officers' "job was to tell the truth," was improper argument.
State v. Hanson , 558 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1996)
A district court decision holding a statute unconstitutional is appealable.
N.D.C.C. 29-01-32, which in some instances requires pretrial disclosure of the names and addresses of persons the defendant intends to call as witnesses at trial and any statements or reports of statements of such persons, is unconstitutional.
Kubista v. Director, ND Dept. of Transportation , 562 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996)
Judgment affirming an administrative suspension of the appellant's driving privileges is summarily affirmed under Rule 35.1, N.D.R.App.P.
State v. Asbridge , 555 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1996)
In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, the state toxicologist's individualized certificate, which incorporated information contained in the attached Form 104 and Analytical Report, satisfied the foundational requirements for admission of the defendant's blood-test result under Section 39-20-07(5), N.D.C.C.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial when the arresting officer testified he informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant asked to call an attorney.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the state toxicologist's deposition testimony in another criminal case as the statement of a party opponent's agent or servant under Rule 801(d)(2), N.D.R.Ev.
State v. Huber , 555 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1996)
Actual physical control is a lesser included offense of driving under the influence.
An instruction which permitted the jury to convict the defendant of DUI even if it found the defendant had only committed the lesser included offense of APC was reversible error.
State v. Zahn , 562 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996)
Driving under suspension conviction summarily affirmed under Rule 35.1, N.D.R.App.
City of Jamestown v. DeGroot , 562 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996)
DUI conviction summarily affirmed under Rule 35.1, N.D.R.App.
State v. Gahner , 554 N.W.2d 818 (N.D. 1996)
The officer did not make a 'stop' by approaching a parked car. When the officer smelled alcohol and saw the defendant's bloodshot eyes, the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal conduct which justified an investigative stop.
State v. Erbele , 554 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1996)
In a prosecution for actual physical control of a motor vehicle, the trial court erred in suppressing as evidence ignition keys found during a consent search of the vehicle after the defendant was lawfully arrested for driving while under the influence.
State v. Thompson , 552 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1996)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion of the defendant, an attorney, to excuse for cause a juror who was a former client of another attorney in the defendant's law firm.
Although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior accident because the State did not give 'reasonable notice in advance of trial' as required by Rule 404(b), N.D.R.Ev., the error was harmless.
State v. Storbakken , 552 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1996)
Minor traffic violations provide a law enforcement officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of a vehicle.
An administrative hearing officer's determination of whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle does not preclude relitigation of the issue in a related criminal proceeding.
Although a motorist who has submitted to a properly administered chemical test yielding a readable result may refuse to submit to a second test, a motorist may not refuse a second test if the first test was defective and was aborted before breath samples were provided.
State v. Steinmetz , 552 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1996)
A police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigative stop where the officer approached the defendant's stopped vehicle and, while conversing with the defendant, smelled alcohol on his breath and obtained a statement that the defendant had been drinking.
State v. Sadek , 552 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1996)
The failure to make a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence on the ground the evidence was illegally obtained constitutes a waiver of the motion, unless the movant establishes cause.
City of Grand Forks v. Zejdlik , 551 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1996)
The police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion the defendant was in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of a city ordinance.
State v. Smaage , 547 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1996)
City of Bismarck v. Stuart , 546 N.W.2d 366 (N.D. 1996)
City of Bismarck v. Feist , 551 N.W.2d 567 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Kvislen , 544 N.W.2d 876 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Glaesman , 545 N.W.2d 178 (N.D. 1996)
City of Fargo v. Schwagel , 544 N.W.2d 873 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Burris , 545 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Jacobson , 545 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Barth , 545 N.W.2d 162 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Olson , 544 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Martin , 543 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Orval Boehler , 542 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Waters , 542 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1996)
City of Grand Forks v. Egley , 542 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Lamb , 541 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1996)
City of Bismarck v. DeCoteau , 544 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Fears , 544 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1996)
State v. Kalina , 544 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1996)
City of Bismarck v. Lembke , 540 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Hawley , 540 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Chihanski , 540 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1995)
City of Fargo v. Mears , 544 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1995)
City of Dickinson v. Powell , 539 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Ova , 539 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Zimmerman , 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995)
Peterson v. ND Dept. of Transportation , 536 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Keyes , 536 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1995)
City of Fargo v. Hector , 534 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Miller , 530 N.W.2d 652 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Graven , 530 N.W.2d 328 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Konewko , 529 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1995)
State v. DuPaul , 527 N.W.2d 238 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Murphy , 527 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1995)
State v. Schroeder , 524 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Rasmussen , 524 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1994)
City of Wahpeton v. Roles , 524 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Satrom , 524 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1994)
City of Bismarck v. Holden , 522 N.W.2d 471 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Mark , 522 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Ternes , 522 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Thompson , 520 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Zink , 519 N.W.2d 581 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Halfmann , 518 N.W.2d 729 (N.D. 1994)
City of Mandan v. Jewett , 517 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Erickson , 517 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1994)
City of Grand Forks v. Mata , 517 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Murphy , 516 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Beaton , 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Zimmerman , 516 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Woehlhoff , 515 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Steier , 515 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994)
City of Bismarck v. Kastrow , 516 N.W.2d 300 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Langseth , 514 N.W.2d 380 (N.D. 1994)
City of Bismarck v. Uhden , 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994)
City of Jamestown v. Erdelt , 513 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. McLaughlin , 512 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Miller , 512 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1994)
City of Grand Forks v. Risser , 512 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Cossette , 512 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Casper , 512 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Robertsdahl , 512 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1994)
City of Fargo v. Bommersbach , 511 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Miller , 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994)
State v. Simon , 510 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1994)
State v. DuPaul , 509 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Jordheim , 508 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Brown , 509 N.W.2d 69 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Fredericks , 507 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Bjornson , 509 N.W.2d 273 (N.D. 1993)
City of Fargo v. Stutlien , 505 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1993)
City of Fargo v. Berntson , 505 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Simek , 502 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1993)
City of Mandan v. Fern , 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Steffes , 500 N.W.2d 608 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Guthmiller , 499 N.W.2d 590 (N.D. 1993)
City of Grafton v. Swanson , 497 N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Guthmiller , 497 N.W.2d 407 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Schuh , 496 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 1993)
State v. Nodland , 493 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Meyer , 494 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Keegan , 493 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1992)
City of Fargo v. Stensland , 492 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Langseth , 492 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Sarhegyi , 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Woytassek , 491 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Lince , 490 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1992)
City of Fargo v. Ruether , 490 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Deery , 489 N.W.2d 887 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Beilke , 489 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Nelson , 488 N.W.2d 600 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Kettleson , 486 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1992)
City of Mandan v. Lembke , 483 N.W.2d 773 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Ganje , 481 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Messner , 481 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1992)
City of Grand Forks v. Soli , 479 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Larson , 479 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1992)
State v. Hornaday , 477 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Bryl , 477 N.W.2d 814 (N.D. 1991)
City of Wahpeton v. Wilkie , 477 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Paulson , 477 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Barnick , 477 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Hook , 476 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Raulston , 475 N.W.2d 127 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Neis , 469 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Parisien , 469 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Zummach , 467 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1991)
State v. Vogel , 467 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1991)
City of Fargo v. Komulainen , 466 N.W.2d 610 (N.D. 1991)
City of Bismarck v. Berger , 465 N.W.2d 480 (N.D. 1991)
City of Stanley v. Earsley , 463 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Lang , 463 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1990)
City of Minot v. Nelson , 462 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Pollack , 462 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Neset , 462 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Boushee , 459 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1990)
City of West Fargo v. Maring , 458 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 1990)
City of Wahpeton v. Desjarlais , 458 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1990)
City of Minot v. Rubbelke , 456 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Stadsvold , 456 N.W.2d 295 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Fasching , 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1990)
City of Minot v. Bjelland , 452 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1990)
State v. Marks , 452 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1990)
City of Minot v. Mattern , 449 N.W.2d 560 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Mische , 448 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1989)
City of Minot v. Geiger , 446 N.W.2d 264 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Hansen , 444 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Moen , 441 N.W.2d 643 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Thordarson , 440 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Sivesind , 439 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Grenz , 437 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Prigge , 437 N.W.2d 520 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Indergaard , 438 N.W.2d 198 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Falk , 434 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Shane , 438 N.W.2d 198 (N.D. 1989)
State v. Dressler , 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Bauder , 433 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Haverluk , 432 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Goeman , 431 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Schwalk , 430 N.W.2d 317 (N.D. 1988)
City of Fargo v. Christiansen , 430 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Wright , 426 N.W.2d 3 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Nygaard , 426 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Pitman , 427 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1988)
Buck v. ND State Highway Commissioner , 425 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Yagow , 423 N.W.2d 498 (N.D. 1988)
City of Bismarck v. Hoopman , 421 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Thomas , 420 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Klocke , 419 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Larson , 419 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Chapin , 429 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1988)
State v. Hensel , 417 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1988)
Kaiser v. State , 417 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Littlewind , 417 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Swenson , 417 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1987)
City of Riverside v. Helenske , 413 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Gahner , 413 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Valgren , 411 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Schimmel , 409 N.W.2d 335 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Reil , 409 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1987)
City of Fargo v. Kuball , 408 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 1987)
City of Bismarck v. Bauer , 409 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Brakke , 408 N.W.2d 735 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Lykken , 406 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1987)
City of Williston v. Miller , 404 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1987)
State v. Lorenzen , 401 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1987)
City of Mandan v. Mertz , 399 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1987)
City of Bismarck v. Saavedra , 397 N.W.2d 455 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Lawyer , 395 N.W.2d 153 (N.D. 1986)
City of Valley City v. Berg , 394 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1986)
City of Langdon v. Delvo , 390 N.W.2d 51 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Martin , 391 N.W.2d 611 (N.D. 1986)
State v. VandeHoven , 388 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Cummings , 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Placek , 386 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Haugen , 384 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1986)
State v. Solberg , 381 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 1986)
City of Bismarck v. Hoffner , 379 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Whitney , 377 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Johnson , 376 N.W.2d 15 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Orr , 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985)
City of Bismarck v. Preston , 374 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Tininenko , 371 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Allery , 371 N.W.2d 133 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Vetsch , 368 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1985)
Pladson v. Hjelle , 368 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Mertz , 362 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Kimball , 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1985)
State v. Dorendorf , 359 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Yellowbird , 359 N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Orseth , 359 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Rambousek , 358 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Kamoni , 358 N.W.2d 524 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Obrigewitch , 356 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Guthmiller , 350 N.W.2d 600 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Kisse , 351 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Gawryluk , 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Frank , 350 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Hanson , 345 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Goodbird , 344 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1984)
State v. Moore , 341 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Freed , 340 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Halvorson , 340 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Lebus , 339 N.W.2d 564 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Shipton , 339 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Jacobson , 338 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Fridley , 335 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Klose , 334 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Edinger , 331 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Garvin , 329 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Berger , 329 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1983)
State v. Abrahamson , 328 N.W.2d 213 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Bergeron , 326 N.W.2d 684 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Engebretson , 326 N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Rummel , 326 N.W.2d 64 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Kouba , 319 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Mehlhoff , 318 N.W.2d 314 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Hepper , 316 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Puhr , 316 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1982)
State v. Larson , 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981)
State v. Knittel , 308 N.W.2d 379 (N.D. 1981)
City of Wahpeton v. Johnson , 303 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1981)
City of Wahpeton v. Skoog , 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1980)
City of Wahpeton v. Skoog , 295 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Rindy , 299 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Koehmstedt , 297 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Fields , 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Hunt , 293 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Teigen , 289 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1980)
State v. Hagstrom , 274 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 1979)
State v. Entze , 272 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1978)
State v. Schneider , 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978)
State v. Ghylin , 250 N.W.2d 252 (N.D. 1977)
State v. Ghylin , 248 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Olson , 244 N.W.2d 718 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Schuler , 243 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Schuler , 236 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Kolb , 239 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Hendrickson , 240 N.W.2d 846 (N.D. 1976)
State v. Ghylin , 222 N.W.2d 864 (N.D. 1974)
State v. Brude , 222 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1974)
State v. Fuchs , 219 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1974)
State v. Salhus , 220 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1974)
State v. Neset , 216 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1974)
State v. Kaloustian , 212 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1973)
City of Minot v. Knudson , 184 N.W.2d 58 (N.D. 1971)
State v. Decker , 181 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1970)
State v. Medearis , 165 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1969)
State v. Miller , 146 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1966)
State v. Johnson , 139 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1965)
State v. Glavkee , 138 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1965)
City of Dickinson v. Simonieg , 136 N.W.2d 126 (N.D. 1965)

Generated from Supreme Court Docket on 09/05/2008