IN THE SUPREME COURT

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State of North Dakota,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FEB 18 2010

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Christian Wolfer

Supreme Ct. No. 20090323

Defendant-Appellant,

District Ct. No. 08-09-K-0798 SA File No. M534-09-05

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPOLLEE

APPEAL FROM AMENDED CRIMINAL JUDGMENT DATED AND FILED JANUARY 4, 2010, AND THE ADVERSE DETERMINATION WITHIN THE AUGUST 31, 2009, ORDER DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

> **Burleigh County District Court** South Central Judicial District The Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, Presiding

Lloyd C. Suhr Burleigh County Assistant State's Attorney Counthouse, 514 East Thayer Avenue Bismarck, North Dakota 58501 Phone No: (701) 222-6672 BAR ID No: 05405 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

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ı STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES Whether the District Court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence?

ARGUMENT

 In <u>City of Bismarck v. Bullinger</u>, 2010 ND 15, ____ N.W.2d ____ this Court recently articulated the well-established standard to be applied when reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress:

[T]his Court defers to the district court's findings of fact and resolves conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. This Court will affirm a district court decision regarding a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the district court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.

The district court denied the Appellant's (Wolfer's) motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the arresting officer's (Iverson's) traffic stop of his vehicle. Officers must have a reasonable suspicion that a motorist has violated the law or probable cause to believe the motorist has done so in order to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Washington, 2007 ND 138, ¶ 11, 737 N.W.2d 586. An officer will have reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity is occurring. Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk, 2006 ND 137, ¶ 9, 717 N.W.2d 586.

Here, there were two critical pieces of evidence presented during the hearing that Wolfer had crossed over the fog line on the

right side of the road in violation of law. First, under direct examination, Iverson testified that while travelling behind Wolfer's pickup at approximately 1:17 a.m. he saw it "veer over the right fog line crossing over onto the shoulder of the roadway back onto the lane of travel". (Trans. p. 7, lines 8-21). He specified that he saw the outside tires travel over the fog line where it continued to drive for ten to twenty feet (Trans. p. 7, lines 25; p. 8, lines 1-7).

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the district court had the opportunity to review the law enforcement video recording of the driving, as a copy of the same was received into evidence by stipulation of the parties. (Trans. p. 3, lines 15-18). This video was, arguably, the most compelling evidence the district court could hope to have before it when reviewing the legalities of Wolfer's driving.

Iverson's testimony and the video (which speaks for itself) clearly establish, from a factual standpoint, that Wolfer crossed the right hand side fog line. Such driving violates N.D.C.C. § 39-10-17.

North Dakota Century Code section 39-10-17(1) provides as follows whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic:

A vehicle must be driven as nearly as practicable *entirely* within a single lane and may not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (Emphasis added)

North Dakota Century Code section 39-01-01(66) defines the

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term "roadway" in relevant part as "[t]hat portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder " (Emphasis added).

In crossing the fog line, which the evidence clearly establishes he did, Wolfer failed to remain entirely within his lane and traveled onto the shoulder, which by definition is not part of the roadway. This is a violation of section 39-10-17 and would justify a law enforcement stop.

Wolfer disputes that the evidence establishes he crossed over or drove on the fog line. He relies primarily on Iverson's apparent testimony during a previous hearing that it was possible Wolfer's tires only drove on or touched the fog line, but did not actually drive onto the other side of it. (Trans. p. 12, lines 12-18). Wolfer's reliance on this prior testimony is misplaced for two reasons.

First, Iverson qualified that his testimony at the time of the previous hearing was without the benefit of reviewing the video recording of the stop prior thereto. (Trans. p. 12, lines 18-20). Secondly, as previously noted, the district court viewed the video. The video speaks for itself and makes Iverson's testimony from a previous hearing of further questionable relevance.

Wolfer further argues that even if the evidence does establish that he crossed the fog line, the same does not constitute a violation of section 39-10-17. He cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions

interpreting statutes very similar in wording to N.D.C.C. § 39-10-17 for the proposition that driving on, touching, or crossing the fog line does not violate such "practicable/practical lane" statutes. However, for two reasons Wolfer's reliance on those cases is misplaced.

First, the cases cited by Wolfer seem to treat crossing or driving on the fog line one time as an insufficiently minor driving violation so that without more, a stop is not justified. However, it is well settled in North Dakota that traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, provide the requisite suspicion for an officer to conduct an investigatory stop. Zimmerman v. N.D.Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 1996). Crossing the fog line, even if only once, and even if considered minor, constitutes a traffic violation for which an officer may conduct a stop.

Second, it appears the trial courts in almost all of those cases cited by Wolfer were forced to review the driving in question without the benefit of video evidence thereof. See U.S. v. Colin, 314 F. 3d 439 (9th Cir. 2002) (no video); U.S. v. Guevara-Martinez, 2000 WL 33593291 (no video); U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F. 3d 464 (6th Cir. 2000) (no video); Rowe v. State, 769 A.2d 879 (Md. 2001)(no video); U.S. v. Ochoa, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (D. Kan. 1998) (video of stop existed but no reference of it capturing driving in question); U.S. v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996)(video of stop existed but no reference of it capturing driving in question).

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In only one of the cases Wolfer cites was video evidence of the actual driving in question apparently presented to the trial court. See State v. Lafferty, 967 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1998). The court in Lafferty, characterized the defendant's driving as "barely" crossing over the fog line. 967 P.2d at 366. As previously discussed, this focus on the degree of a violation is contrary to the position taken in North Dakota that even minor driving violations may justify a stop. Accordingly, the Lafferty case is of questionable persuasive value.

Wolfer also suggests that to the extent the evidence supports a finding that N.D.C.C. § 39-10-17 was violated, distractions created by other vehicles on the road accounted for the violation. However, this argument overlooks both the video evidence and Iverson's testimony that there were no obstructions in the roadway to explain Wolfer's driving. (Trans. p. 8, lines 19-22). Even if there had been a possible n obstruction present, the reasonable suspicion standard does not require law enforcement to rule out every possible innocent explanation for the driving in question before stopping a vehicle. State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 160, ¶ 7, 739 N.W.2d 786.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the manifest weight of the evidence from Iverson's testimony and the video provided support the district court's finding of a violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-17 and resulting Order Denying Motion to Suppress. The State respectfully requests that the Order, Criminal Judgment and amendments thereto be affirmed in their entirety.

Dated this 17th day of February, 2010.

Lloyd C./Suhr

Burleigh County Assistant State's Attorney

Courthouse, 514 East Thayer Avenue

Bismarck, North Dakota 58501 Phone No: (701) 222-6672

BAR ID No: 05405

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

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10	STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA)		
11	COUNTY OF BURLEIGH)		
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Michelle Dresser-Ternes, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am a United States citizen over 21 years old, and on the Istate day of February, 2010, I deposited in a sealed envelope a true copy of the attached: 1. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee 2. Affidavit of Mailing in the United States mail at Bismarck, North Dakota, postage prepaid, addressed to: DAN HERBEL ATTORNEY AT LAW 3333 E BROADWAY AVE, STE 1205 BISMARCK, ND 58501		
21	which address is the last known address of the addressee.		
22	Michelle Dresser-Ternes		
24	Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18^{4} day of February, 2010.		
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25 26	KIMBERLY S BLESS Notary Public State of North Dakota Kimberly S. Bless, Notary Public Burleigh County, North Dakota		
27	My Commission Expires February 24, 2010 My Commission Expires: 2-24-2010.		