# IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

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Nathan Fehl-Haber,

Petitioner-Appellant,

-vs
State of North Dakota,

Respondent-Appellee

District Ct. No. 08-05-K-0981

SA File No. F 403-05-05

#### BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

#### APPEAL FROM SECOND POST-CONVICTION

Burleigh County District Court South Central Judicial District The Honorable Sonna M. Anderson, Presiding

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## ì **TABLE OF CONTENTS** Page No. Table of Authorities ......i Statement of the Issues......

#### 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page No. 3 4 Cases 5 Dunn v. State 6 Garcia v. State 7 2004 ND 81, 678 N.W.2d 568 ......9 8 Henke v. State 2009 ND 117, 767 N.W.2d 881 ...... 8 10 Jensen v. State 2004 ND 200, 688 N.W.2d 374 ......9 11 12 Johnson v. State 2004 ND 130, 681 N.W.2d 769 ...... 5. 9 13 Johnson v. State 14 15 Laib v. State 16 17 Mertz v. State 18 19 St. Clare v. State 2002 ND 10, 638 N.W.2d 39. ...... 12 20 State v. Bender 21 1998 ND 72, 576 N.W.2d 210 ....... 22 State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber I) 23 24 State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber II) 25 26 State v. Steen 27

1	Steen v. State
2	2007 ND 123, 736 N.W.2d 457
3	Vandeberg v. State
4	2003 ND 71, 660 N.W.2d 568
5	<u>Wheeler v. State</u> 2008 ND 109,750 N.W.2d 446
6	
7	Statutes
8	N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-06
9	§ 27-52.1-00
10	N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-06(2)
11	N.D.C.C.
12	§ 29-32.1-09(1)
13	N.D.C.C.
14	§ 29-32.1-12
15	N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1)
16	•
17	N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2)
18	
19	Rules
20	North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(vi)
21	
22	North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(vi) or (c)
23	North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
24	Rule 12(b)
25	North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
26	Rule 56
27	

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2	North Dakota Rules of Evidence Rule 41210	
3		
4		
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1	STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES	
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3	The district court did not err in denying the second application for post- conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.	
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#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 16, 2005, the defendant, Nathan Fehl-Haber (hereinafter Fehl-Haber) was charged with one count of Gross Sexual Imposition, Class A Felony, and one count of Delivery of Alcohol to Minor, a Class A Misdemeanor, by complaint and pled not guilty to the offense.

On November 16-18, 2005, a jury trial was conducted with Fehl-Haber being found guilty of the offense of Gross Sexual Imposition.

Fehl-Haber appealed his conviction and the district court's denial of his motion for new trial. Both were affirmed following appeal. State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber I), 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770; and State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber II), 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963.

The relevant facts and procedural background of this case were developed in that appeal. Additional facts as they relate to each issue shall be brought out in the brief.

#### **ARGUMENT**

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ND 228, ¶ 9, 690 N.W.2d 239.

"Post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure." <u>Laib v. State</u>, 2005 ND 187, ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d 845. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of establishing grounds for post-conviction relief. <u>State v. Steen</u>, 2004

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE SECOND APPLICATION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

The district court did not err when it determined that Fehl-Haber's argument was without merit, since the issues raised by him were disposed of in his direct appeal and his first post-conviction application. State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber I), 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770; and State v. Fehl-Haber (Fehl Haber II), 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963. Post-conviction proceedings are not intended to allow defendants multiple opportunities to raise the same or similar issues, and defendants who inexcusably fail to raise all of their claims in a single post-conviction proceeding misuse the post-conviction process by initiating a subsequent application raising issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Steen v. State, 2007 ND 123 ¶ 13, 736 N.W.2d 457.

Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (Post-Conviction Act), the State may move for dismissal by either submitting a response via an answer or motion. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-06 (2010); and <u>Vandeberg v. State</u>, 2003 ND 71, ¶ 4, 660 N.W.2d 568. This Court has determined that the Post-

Conviction Act allows for two types of dismissals, one which is similar to a motion under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(vi) or (c) and the other which is akin to a motion under Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. <u>Dunn v. State</u>, 2006 ND 26, ¶ 8, 709 N.W.2d 1.

#### A. The district court had the authority to dismiss Fehl-Haber's application under Rule 12(b), N.D.R.Civ.P.

The Post-Conviction Act provides, in part:

The state may move to dismiss an application on the ground that it is evident from the application that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. In considering the motion, the court shall take account of substance regardless of defects of form.

N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-06(2) (2010). This language is analogous to a motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(vi) & (c); and Johnson v. State, 2005 ND 188, ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d 830. Under this type of review, the court may rely solely on the pleadings in granting a summary disposition motion. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 14. Under a Rule 12(b) analysis, the adverse party has 10 days to respond to a petition for relief. Id. at ¶14. The trial court should not dismiss a motion on the pleadings under Rule 12 unless it appears that the movant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him relief. Id. at ¶20.

If the State's motion requesting summary dismissal asks a court to go beyond the pleadings, the motion is no longer to be treated as a Rule 12(b)

motion; rather, it is analyzed as a Rule 56 motion under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. <u>Johnson v. State</u>, 2005 ND 188 ¶ 15, 705 N.W.2d 830.

Here, Fehl-Haber merely provided an application setting forth a statement for each ground of relief sought. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 62-64. No exhibits, affidavits, or other documents were submitted by Fehl-Haber with his brief or following the State's request for summary disposition. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 1-2. In denying Fehl-Haber's application, the district court relied only on the pleadings. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 1-2. Thus, under a Rule 12(b) motion, analogous to North Dakota Century Code § 29-32.1-06(2), the district court had authority to dismiss the petition on the pleadings and without a hearing.

Additionally, Fehl-Haber has failed to argue that the district court should have applied Rule 56 by way of North Dakota Century Code § 29-32.1-09(1) rather than Rule 12(b) by way of § 29-32.1-06(2), thereby entitling him to thirty days to respond to the State's motion. Because Fehl-Haber has not raised this issue, this Court should treat the district court's decision as a dismissal of the application similarly to Rule 12(b)(vi) or (c). See Johnson v. State, 2004 ND 130, ¶ 6, 681 N.W.2d 769 (When an appellant fails to raise the issue of how many days he should have been afforded to respond to State's brief, the Court treated the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(vi)). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his second post-conviction application pursuant to Rule 12 (b) and North Dakota Century Code § 29-32.1-06(2).

# B. The district court could have also summarily dismissed the application under Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P.

The Post-Conviction Act also allows summary disposition that is parallel to Rule 56 North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and provides in part:

The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(1) (2010); and Johnson v. State, 2005 ND 188 ¶ 10, 15, 705 N.W.2d 830. When a court is asked to go beyond the pleadings, it still may summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.D.C.C § 29-32.1-09(1) (2010); and Wheeler v. State 2008 ND 109, ¶ 5, 750 N.W.2d 446.

The party moving for summary dismissal has the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact. <u>Dunn v. State</u>, 2006 ND 26, ¶ 10, 709 N.W.2d 1 (quoting <u>Mertz v. State</u>, 535 N.W.2d 834, 836 (N.D. 1995)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if reasonable minds could draw different inferences and reach different conclusions from the undisputed facts. <u>Vandeberg v. State</u>, 2003 ND 71, ¶ 5, 660 N.W.2d 568. If the party moving for summary dismissal shows the absence of a genuine material fact issue, the burden then

 shifts to the responding party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. <u>Id.</u> The party opposing the motion may not merely rely upon the pleadings or upon unsupported, conclusory allegations, but must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact. <u>Dunn v. State</u>, 2006 ND 26, ¶ 10, 709 N.W.2d 1 (quoting <u>Mertz v. State</u>, 535 N.W.2d 834, 836 (N.D. 1995)).

Even if this Court determines that a Rule 56 analysis was the appropriate basis for review, the outcome would be the same. Fehl-Haber failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Appellant's Appendix pp. 62-62; and Appellant's Response pp. 1-2. The issues Fehl-Haber currently asserts have already been raised and disposed of on his direct appeal, first post-conviction application, and his appeal of the district court's order denying his first post-conviction relief. Fehl Haber I, 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770; and Fehl-Haber II, 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963. Thus, Fehl-Haber has not raised an issue of material fact in his second post-conviction application.

Additionally, Fehl-Haber argues that the statute governing post-conviction applications does not require him to provide supporting evidentiary matter. Appellant Brief pp. 5-9. While this may be true with regards to Fehl-Haber's initial burden under the Post-Conviction Act, his argument is incomplete, because the State put Fehl-Haber on his proof when they moved

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for summary dismissal. <u>Henke v. State</u>, 2009 ND 117, ¶ 9, 767 N.W.2d 881 (citing <u>State v. Bender</u>, 1998 ND 72, ¶ 20, 576 N.W.2d 210).

A petitioner must support his or her application with evidence if the State moves for summary dismissal. <u>Id.</u> For Fehl-Haber to proceed, he was required to properly respond to the motion and provide proof of his claim. <u>Id.</u>; and Appellant's Appendix pp. 1-2. Fehl-Haber failed to do so. Appellant's Appendix, pp. 1-2, 62-65; and Appellant's Response pp.1-3. Fehl-Haber's application and response to the State's motion provided only conclusory statements which were not accompanied by any evidentiary support. Appellant's Appendix pp. 62-64; and Appellant's Response pp. 1-2.

Therefore, Fehl-Haber is mistaken in believing that he was not required to provide evidentiary support of his claim and he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Having put Fehl-Haber on his proof, his failure to appropriately respond was fatal. See, Dunn v. State, 2006 ND 26, ¶ 12, 709 N.W.2d 1 (Petitioner's failure to appropriately respond was fatal and district court's dismissal of the action was appropriate). For the reasons stated above, the district court could have also dismissed the second post-conviction application under a Rule 56 analysis.

Finally, regardless of whether this Court applies N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-06(2) or § 29-32.1-09(1), Fehl-Haber is not entitled to post-conviction relief.

# C. Res judicata and misuse of process bars Fehl-Haber from re-litigating the same claims.

An application for post-conviction relief may be denied under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12 on grounds of res judicata or misuse of process. Relief may be denied as res judicata under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(1) if the same claim or claims were "fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding." Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2), misuse of process occurs when a post-conviction relief applicant "[p]resents a claim for relief which the applicant inexcusably failed to raise either in a proceeding leading to judgment of conviction and sentence or in a previous post conviction proceeding," or if the applicant "[f]iles multiple applications containing a claim so lacking in factual support or legal basis as to be frivolous." See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 2004 ND 200, ¶ 9, 688 N.W.2d 374.

Again "[p]ost-conviction proceedings are not intended to allow defendants multiple opportunities to raise the same or similar issues." <u>Id.</u> (citing, <u>Johnson v. State</u>, 2004 ND 130, ¶ 13, 681 N.W.2d 769). This Court has explained that "[d]efendants are not entitled to post-conviction relief when their claims are merely variations of previous claims that have been rejected." <u>Id.</u> (citing, <u>Garcia v. State</u>, 2004 ND 81, ¶ 22, 678 N.W.2d 568).

Fehl-Haber is trying to re-litigate issues that have already been adjudicated. Appellant's Appendix pp. 29-61. Fehl-Haber argues that the State failed to disclose evidence regarding K.L.S.'s sexual history. Appellant Brief pp. 6-7. This exact issue, however, was addressed in Fehl-Haber's

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 direct appeal and first post-conviction application. <u>Fehl-Haber I</u>, 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770; and <u>Fehl-Haber II</u>, 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963. The district court's order regarding the first post-conviction application stated that:

The victim's sexual history either prior to or subsequent to May 13, 2005 is not relevant at trial, as the GSI [gross sexual imposition] occurred without her knowledge or consent. Whether she was chaste or promiscuous in the normal course of her life, the victim's sexual history is not relevant as she was unconscious at the time.

(Appellant's Appendix. p. 52).

That application for relief was not only disposed of by the district court, but this Court affirmed the district court's order denying post-conviction relief. <u>Fehl-Haber I</u>, 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770.

In <u>Fehl-Haber I</u>, this Court addressed Fehl-Haber's claims that there was a discovery violation for failing to disclose evidence regarding prior allegation, and the prior allegation was relevant to the victim's credibility. 2007 ND 99, ¶21, 734 N.W.2d 770. This Court determined, contrary to Fehl-Haber's assertions, the evidence regarding K.L.S.'s sexual history was not material or exculpatory. <u>Id.</u> at ¶23. Nor did the alleged new evidence in this case warrant a new trial. <u>Id.</u> Fehl-Haber acknowledged he deposed K.L.S. prior to the trial. <u>Id.</u> at ¶23. This Court concluded Fehl-Haber had not demonstrated that this alleged new evidence would provide any new evidence not already available to him by deposition, which would be admissible under N.D. R. Evid. 412. <u>Id.</u> Therefore, Fehl-Haber has not established that his

alleged evidence was material or likely to result in an acquittal, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fehl-Haber's motion. <u>Id.</u>

Further, in <u>Fehl-Haber II</u>, this Court affirmed the district court's decision denying Fehl-Haber's first post-conviction application in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State withheld information from him. <u>Fehl-Haber II</u>, 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963.

In Fehl-Haber's current post-conviction application and response to the State's motion, he is arguing that this newly obtained evidence shows "that K.L.S. has a history of G.S.I cases against a number of individuals and that this Court should grant this Post Conviction Relief." (Appellant's Response p. 2; See also, Appellant Appendix pp. 62-64). This, again, is the exact same argument Fehl-Haber presented in his direct appeal and first post-conviction application. Fehl-Haber I, 2007 ND 99, 734 N.W.2d 770; and Fehl-Haber II, 2009 ND 128, 776 N.W.2d 232, unpublished disposition 2009 WL 2050963.

This Court must come to the conclusion that Fehl-Haber has failed to present an issue that has not already been adjudicated. In Fehl-Haber's second post-conviction application and response to the State's motion, he regurgitates what has already been decided by the district court and affirmed by this Court in his first post-conviction application. Appellant Appendix pp. 29-64; and Appellant Response pp.1-3. This Court has determined that "a defendant is not entitled to post-conviction relief if the contentions raised are

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1	simply variations of previous arguments." St. Clare v. State, 2002 ND 10, ¶	
2	13, 638 N.W.2d 39. Therefore, the district court did not err when it	
3	summarily dismissed Fehl-Haber's second post-conviction application.	
4	CONCLUSION	
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7	Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that the district court's	
8	order denying post conviction relief be affirmed.	
9	Dated thisday of June, 2010.	
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