

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Dirk Edmond Jodoin,

Appellant/Petitioner,

v.

Grant Levi, Director of the
North Dakota Department of
Transportation,

Appellee/Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 20150185
District Court Case No. 45-2014-CV-00063**APPELLANT'S BRIEF****APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
STARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THE
HONORABLE ZANE ANDERSON,
AFFIRMING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

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[¶3] JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

[¶4] The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to N.D. Const. art. VI § 8, N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(4) and N.D.C.C. § 39-20-06. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under N.D. Const. art. VI § 6, N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01 and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02. This appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a)(1).

[¶5] STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the Administrative Hearing Officer err because the Department failed to prove that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest the Appellant, Mr. Jodoin?

II. Did the Administrative Hearing Officer err because the breath samples taken by law enforcement were warrantless searches and the Department failed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement and therefore the Hearing Officer's decision violated the Appellant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota?

III. Did the Administrative Hearing Officer err because Article I, Section 20 of North Dakota's Constitution and or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine articulated in Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) apply to North Dakota's implied consent law making it unconstitutional when a test is sought without a valid search warrant thus denying Mr. Jodoin substantive due process both by conditioning the grant of the privilege of driving in return for the waiver of a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search or withdraw that consent pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota and criminalizing Mr. Jodoin's right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search?

[¶6] STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[¶7] Appellant, Dirk Edmond Jodoin, appeals from the North Dakota Department of Transportation's November 14, 2014 Order suspending his North Dakota driving privileges for 91 days, the decision of Hearing Officer Sarah Huber dated January 7, 2015 affirming the November 14, 2014 order and denying Mr. Jodoin's prayer for relief and the District Court's Order and Judgment affirming the Department's Order.

[¶8] STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

[¶9] On October 17, 2014 law enforcement made contact with Mr. Jodoin and stopped him for speeding. Transcript page 4, lines 8-13; page 5, line 16 to page 6, line 12 (T. 4:11-13; 5:16-6:12). Law enforcement noticed Mr. Jodoin had watery bloodshot eyes and the odor of an alcoholic beverage but did not believe there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Jodoin. T. 6:24-7:1; 19:6-17. Law enforcement then conducted field sobriety testing on Mr. Jodoin. T. 7:25-11:5. Law enforcement did not give Mr. Jodoin a choice to refuse field sobriety tests, after giving Mr. Jodoin the speeding citation the law enforcement officer told Mr. Jodoin that he wanted to do a quick check on Mr. Jodoin's eyes and then proceeded with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Exhibit 16 (DVD) at 9:45. Law enforcement had Mr. Jodoin perform the walk and turn test and the one legged stand in the same manner, not giving Mr. Jodoin a choice to take the tests or not. Id. from 9:45 forward.

[¶10] After conducting field sobriety tests law enforcement invoked the North Dakota implied consent advisory and requested a screening test, Mr. Jodoin complied with the screening test and was arrested. T. 11:7-12:14.

[¶11] After being arrested Mr. Jodoin was transported to the law enforcement center and law enforcement again invoked the North Dakota implied consent advisory and requested that Mr. Jodoin perform a breath test, Mr. Jodoin complied with the request to take a breath test. T. 12:17-14:12.

[¶12] **LAW AND ARGUMENT**

[¶13] **Standard of Review**

[¶14] “[R]eview of an administrative agency’s suspension of a driver’s license is governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28–32.” Richter v.

N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2010 ND 150, ¶ 6, 786 N.W.2d 716.

[¶15] N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46 states the standard of review for this matter.

A judge of the district court must review an appeal from the determination of an administrative agency based only on the record filed with the court. After a hearing, the filing of briefs, or other disposition of the matter as the judge may reasonably require, the court must affirm the order of the agency unless it finds that any of the following are present:

1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency's rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.

If the order of the agency is not affirmed by the court, it must be modified or reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the agency for disposition in accordance with the order of the court.

[¶16] N.D.C.C. § 28-32-24(3) states that

[u]pon proper objection, evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds, or on the basis of evidentiary privilege recognized in the courts of this state, may be excluded. In the absence of proper objection, the agency, or any person conducting a proceeding for it, may exclude objectionable evidence.

See Richter v. North Dakota Department of Transportation, 2008 ND 105, ¶9 (N.D. 2008), 750 N.W.2d 430.

[¶17] “An agency’s decisions on questions of law are fully reviewable.” Kiecker v.

North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2005 ND 23, ¶ 8, 691 N.W.2d 266 (citations omitted). “Whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law,” which is fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 10, 685 N.W.2d 120. “The existence of consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 13. Whether consent is voluntary is generally decided from the totality of the circumstances. McCoy v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2014 ND 119, ¶ 14. The “standard of review for a claimed violation of a constitutional right is de novo.” Id. at ¶ 8.

[¶18] **Analysis**

I. The Administrative Hearing Officer erred because the Department failed to prove that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Mr. Jodoin.

[¶19] The Administrative Hearing Officer erred because Mr. Jodoin did not voluntarily submit to field sobriety testing and the results of his field sobriety tests were used to establish probable cause for his arrest. Compare City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1980)(noting that field sobriety tests are physical and real evidence); compare City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 15, 755 N.W.2d 485(“If an investigative detention lasts too long or its manner of execution unreasonably infringes an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, it may no longer be justified as an investigative stop and, as a full-fledged seizure . . .”).

[¶20] Absent the results of the field sobriety tests law enforcement did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Jodoin as indicated by the arresting officer in his testimony. T. 19:6-17. Further, as indicated in the recording of the encounter preserved on Exhibit 16, law enforcement did not give Mr. Jodoin a choice to perform field sobriety tests and therefore, under a totality of the circumstances, Mr. Jodoin did not consent to the search

and the results obtained therefrom should have been suppressed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).

[¶21] **Analysis**

II. The Administrative Hearing Officer erred because the breath samples taken by law enforcement were warrantless searches and the Department failed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement and therefore the Hearing Officer's decision violated the Appellant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota.

[¶22] In this case Mr. Jodoin was subjected to searches when he submitted to the taking of breath samples both before and after his arrest. Mr. Jodoin's argument is that absent a search warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement those searches were illegal and any evidence obtained therefrom should be suppressed. Mr. Jodoin acknowledges that his following arguments have for the most part been previously addressed in North Dakota in a line of cases beginning with McCoy v. North Dakota Department of Transportation, 2014 ND 119, 848 N.W.2d 659. Several of those cases have filed for a writ of certiorari that is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court. See State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302, reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 16, 2015); State v. Washburn, 2015 ND 8, 861 N.W.2d 173, reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 16, 2015); Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d 403, reh'g denied (Mar. 24, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 23, 2015); State v. Beylund, 2015 ND 27, 861 N.W.2d 172, reh'g denied (Mar. 24, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 23, 2015); Culver v. Levi, 2015 ND 26, 861 N.W.2d 172, reh'g denied (Mar. 24, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 23, 2015); State v. Harns, 2015 ND 45, 861 N.W.2d 173, reh'g denied (Mar. 24, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 24, 2015);

Wojahn v. Levi, 2015 ND 50, 861 N.W.2d 173, reh'g denied (Apr. 28, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed July 28, 2015).

[¶23] “[E]ver since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), evidence obtained by search and seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment is, by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, inadmissible in State courts. State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965).” State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 99 (N.D. 1974). Because in this case breath samples were obtained without a warrant, and in the absence of any valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota, the order suspending Mr. Jodoin’s driving privileges for 91 days that relies on those search results violates his constitutional rights and should be rescinded. See N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.

[¶24] Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1974). The Fourth Amendment requires that consent to a search be voluntary. Schneckloth; State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979). To determine what constitutes “voluntary consent” the court considers the totality of the circumstances at the time that consent was given. State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976). Consent must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice; it cannot be the product of coercion. Schneckloth. However, if in seeking consent law enforcement makes a claim of lawful authority to search then the totality of the circumstances standard does not apply. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

[¶25] The facts of this case demonstrate that Mr. Jodoin was coerced into giving his

consent by the reading of the Implied Consent Advisory which included the threat of criminal charges. Essentially, Mr. Jodoin was allowed the privilege to drive and to not be charged criminally in return for the surrender of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. Mr. Jodoin was not presented a free and unconstrained choice.

[¶26] Consent is voluntary if it is “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222. Consent is involuntary if it results from circumstances that overbear the consenting party’s will and impairs his or her capacity for self-determination. Id. at 233. The Department cannot prove consent simply by showing an individual acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority or submitted to a show of force. Bumper at 548. Fourth Amendment consent does not lie where the police claim to have a right to the result. Id. at 550. In Bumper, the police showed up at the defendant’s home with a search warrant, and upon showing it to the defendant’s grandmother, she consented to allow them to search the defendant’s home. The Court in Bumper said:

One is not held to have consented to the search of his premises where it is accomplished pursuant to an apparently valid search warrant. On the contrary, the legal effect is that consent is on the basis of such a warrant and his permission is construed as an intention to abide by the law and not resist the search under the warrant rather than an invitation to search.

One who, upon the command of an officer authorized to enter and search and seize by search warrant, opens the door to the officer and acquiesces in obedience to such a request, no matter by what language used in such acquiescence, is but showing a regard for the supremacy of the law The presentation of a search warrant to those in charge at the place to be searched, by one authorized to serve it, is tinged with coercion, and submission thereto cannot be considered an invitation that would waive the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather is to be considered a submission to the law. (Citations omitted).

Id. at 549, fn. 14.

[¶27] Mr. Jodoin’s case is analogous to Bumper because law enforcement informs him that if he refuses to take the test it is a separate crime, just like the presentation of a search warrant stating that the court requires that the suspect submit to a search law enforcement informed Mr. Jodoin that the law of the State of North Dakota requires him to submit to a search or it is a crime. Under these rules, the Department has the burden to prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Id. at 548. But to do so the standard is NOT the totality of the circumstances from Schneckloth but rather because Mr. Jodoin acquiesced to the lawful authority invoked against him “submission thereto cannot be considered an invitation that would waive the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather is to be considered a submission to the law.” Bumper at 549, fn. 14. Law enforcement in this case used North Dakota’s implied consent law and the threat of the crime of test refusal to circumvent the warrant requirement. Mr. Jodoin had two choices when he was asked to consent to a test: consent to a warrantless search or lose his privilege to drive and be charged with a crime.

[¶28] However, beginning with McCoy North Dakota has followed the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013) regarding the same issue of consent being argued in this case. Brooks explains that standing alone being informed of the consequences of refusal does not amount to coercion even if those consequences include a loss of driving privileges and being charged with a crime. Despite stating that “[t]he obvious and intended effect of the implied-consent law is to coerce the driver suspected of driving under the influence into 'consenting' to chemical testing” in Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn.

1976), before refusal was a crime in Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Brooks does not explain its decision to find now that Minnesota's implied consent law does not coerce the driver despite a scathing dissent from Justice Stras.

[¶29] Mr. Jodoin is arguing to overturn precedent set by the North Dakota Supreme Court in its consideration of Brooks and find that under a totality of the circumstances only the issue of being advised of the consequences of refusal standing alone did not amount to coercion but that consent itself is not valid for fourth amendment purposes when it is conditioned on the receipt of a government benefit. In doing so the Court would adopt the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Lebron v. Florida, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014). Lebron explains that consent is not valid for fourth amendment purposes when it is conditioned on the receipt of a government benefit. Id. at opinion pages 46-54. In the case of Jodoin's situation his consent was conditioned on not only the receipt of the government benefit but also the criminalization of his failure to consent.

[¶30] The heart of the issue is whether or not Mr. Jodoin had a constitutional right to refuse the requests to submit breath samples. The North Dakota Supreme Court has so far only addressed the statutory provision that provides that no test shall be conducted if the driver refuses. The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015), reh'g denied (Mar. 16, 2015)(pet. for cert. docketed June 16, 2015) has found that a driver does not have a constitutional right to refuse a request to take a breath test. Mr. Jodoin argues that he does have a constitutional right to refuse a chemical test of breath, blood or urine.

[¶31] What the Minnesota Supreme Court has done in Brooks and Bernard is create a

new categorical exception to the warrant requirement under the fourth amendment however a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in McNeely refused such an approach writing that “the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where significant privacy interests are at stake.” Id. at opinion page 19. In its majority opinion the United States Supreme Court wrote that regarding McNeely “the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.” Id. at opinion page 26.

[¶32] Mr. Jodoin argues that if he has a constitutional right to refuse a warrantless request to take a chemical test then criminalizing his exercise of that right to gain his consent makes his consent involuntary. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Birchfield distinguished Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and cases like it on the basis that those cases found it unconstitutional to penalize refusal in a suspicionless search circumstance which apparently would leave open whether or not it is unconstitutional to penalize a refusal in a suspicion search circumstance. See Beylund at¶14, quoting Birchfield (“Unlike the regulation in Camara which allowed for suspicionless searches of private property, implied consent laws, like North Dakota law, do not authorize chemical testing unless an officer has probable cause to believe the defendant is under the influence, and the defendant will already have been arrested on the charge.”).

[¶33] It seems axiomatic however that if it is constitutional to criminalize a refusal to consent to a warrantless search then the fourth amendment warrant requirement is not an

inalienable right and is otherwise meaningless, being subject to the whim of any legislative endeavor to make its assertion a crime. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in

Lebron

[t]he State says that deposition testimony from Lebron indicates that he freely signed the consent form and knew he could refuse the drug test, albeit at the expense of his TANF eligibility. This fact does not affect the result because “[s]urrendering to drug testing in order to remain eligible for a government benefit such as employment or welfare, whatever else it is, is not the type of consent that automatically renders a search reasonable as a matter of law.”

Id. at opinion pages 47-48, quoting Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mut. Employees Counsel 79 v. Scott, 717 F.3d 851, 873 (11th Cir. 2013). Mr. Jodoin argues that the consent analysis in Lebron and the dissenting opinion in Brooks are far superior to the conclusory assertions of the majority opinion in Brooks and that North Dakota should abandon its reliance on Brooks regarding consent and find instead that penalizing and criminalizing a refusal to consent renders that consent invalid for fourth amendment purposes.

[¶34] In Bumper it was never determined if the search warrant was valid or not because the State in that case only relied on consent. That being said however Mr. Jodoin argues the crime of test refusal used to coerce his consent is invalid by being unconstitutional. “[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). Searches that impose “significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” and are “authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual.” Id. at 534. It is unconstitutional to

require ‘consent’ to such searches by imposing criminal sanctions for refusal. Id. at 525-534.

[¶35] In Camara, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a housing code which required an occupant to allow a city inspector to enter the occupant’s building, without a warrant. Id. at 526. The defendant refused to allow a warrantless inspection, and was charged with a misdemeanor for such refusal. Id. at 526-527. The Court, overruling its own precedent, held that such searches were a significant invasion of privacy, requiring Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 525-34. The Court reasoned that the defendant should not be subject to criminal sanctions for requiring a warrant as was Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right. Id. at 531-534. Like the administrative code in Camara, North Dakota’s implied consent law and criminal statute making refusal a crime are unconstitutional.

[¶36] In Schneckloth, the United States Supreme Court warned us about the consequences of attempting to bypass constitutional commands by creating or relying on a legal fiction when it wrote that

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. In the words of the classic admonition in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.Ct. 524, 535, 29 L.Ed. 746:

‘It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and

leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.’

Schneckloth at 228-229. North Dakota’s Constitution forbids the North Dakota legislature or a North Dakota agency to draft a law or rule to circumvent the warrant requirement found in Article I section 8. Article I, Section 20 explicitly states that “[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate.” As such Article I Section 8 cannot be excepted by the Department and the search warrant requirement cannot be excepted by North Dakota’s implied consent law.

[¶37] North Dakota’s “implied consent” cannot substitute for the consent necessary for an exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶39, 809 N.W.2d 309 (“Hayes had two choices when confronted by the officers asking whether they could search her residence: consent to a warrantless search or violate her release conditions and be subject to an arrest warrant for failing to comply with the district court’s order. Consent based upon duress or coercion is not voluntary. Id. Under the circumstances, Hayes did not provide voluntary consent to search 210 Adams Street.”); but see McCoy . Like the appellant in Hayes Mr. Jodoin was coerced into giving his consent to a search. In Hayes it was the threat of violating a condition of release and in Mr. Jodoin’s case it was the threat of violating North Dakota law that caused him to consent to the search. Under the circumstances of this case the Department cannot prove that Mr. Jodoin freely and voluntarily consented to what would otherwise be an unconstitutional warrantless searches and the North Dakota Constitution forbids the

drafting of a law that circumvents the warrant requirement by making it a crime to invoke the right to refuse a warrantless search.

[¶38] **Analysis**

III. The Administrative Hearing Officer erred because Article I, Section 20 of North Dakota's Constitution and or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine apply to North Dakota's implied consent law making it unconstitutional when a test is sought without a valid search warrant.

[¶39] In Frost v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) the United States Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions stating that

as a general rule, the state, having the power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution * * * may thus be manipulated out of existence.

Id. at 593-94. Because the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should apply in North Dakota just as it did in California Mr. Jodoin should not have to relinquish a Constitutional Right in order to obtain a privilege. But North Dakota's implied consent law does just that by conditioning the grant of the privilege to drive upon a driver's surrender of his Constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches by requiring that the driver submit to a test without a warrant. The condition becomes even more egregious when the State threatens to charge a crime for failure to consent to a warrantless search.

[¶40] Mr. Jodoin argues that he has a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search and that he therefore has a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless request to take a breath, blood or urine test. Mr. Jodoin argues that North

Dakota's implied consent laws are designed to circumvent the warrant requirement and coerce a driver to provide consent to a warrantless search. To pursue its purpose, to compel drivers to consent to a chemical test, the North Dakota legislature has violated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and Article 1 Section 20 of North Dakota's Constitution by drafting laws that require drivers to consent to warrantless searches in order to obtain the privilege to drive and by making it a crime to refuse a warrantless search.

[¶41] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects a person's right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search under various circumstances. In District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), the Court held that refusing to unlock the door to one's home does not constitute misdemeanor interference with a health inspection. Emphasizing that the defendant "neither used nor threatened force of any kind," the Court observed that a prohibition against "interfering with or preventing any inspection" to determine a home's sanitary condition "cannot fairly be interpreted to encompass" a person's mere failure to unlock a door and permit a warrantless entry. Id. at 5, 7. The Court reasoned that "[t]he right to privacy in the home holds too high a place in our system of laws to justify a statutory interpretation that would impose a criminal punishment on one who does nothing more than" refuse to unlock a door. Id. at 7. Similarly, in Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967), the Court recognized an individual's constitutional right to resist a warrantless housing inspection, noting that the "appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection." Likewise, in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967), the Court

recognized a person's constitutional right to resist a warrantless fire inspection, observing that the "appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant's locked warehouse."

[¶42] Reversing a conviction for harboring a fugitive in United States v. Prescott, 581F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit held that "passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered evidence of criminal wrongdoing." The Prescott court supported its holding with this reasoning:

"When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search." When, on the other hand, the officer demands entry but presents no warrant, there is a presumption that the officer has no right to enter, because it is only in certain carefully defined circumstances that lack of a warrant is excused. An occupant can act on that presumption and refuse admission. He need not try to ascertain whether, in a particular case, the absence of a warrant is excused. He is not required to surrender his Fourth Amendment protection on the say so of the officer. The Amendment gives him a constitutional right to refuse to consent to entry and search. His asserting it cannot be a crime.

Id. at 1350-51 (citations omitted).

[¶43] In Beylund v. Levi, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the same argument Mr. Jodoin is making now. However, as Mr. Jodoin argued above, the heart of the matter is whether or not he has a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a warrantless request to submit to a chemical test. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Beylund did not specifically address the question, only coming close by stating at ¶25 that "[a]ssuming Beylund has a constitutional right to refuse, it does not necessarily invalidate the implied consent law under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine."

[¶44] In Beylund the North Dakota Supreme Court assumed facts not in the record to determine the purpose of the implied consent law. In doing so however Beylund ignored the other side of the equation, that being that North Dakota's implied consent law creates a statutory categorical exception to the warrant requirement. So far the Department has failed to establish any need for such an exception. The purpose of implied consent laws as articulated in the case relied on by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Beylund, Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), is actually to provide for summary suspension of driver's licenses not circumvent the warrant requirement. The two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Including a warrant requirement does not interfere with implied consent laws.

[¶45] Assuming Mr. Jodoin did have a constitutional right to refuse, conditioning his driving privileges on the waiver of that right is unconstitutional because the State has no need for Mr. Jodoin to waive that constitutional right. For example, assume law enforcement first obtained a search warrant. Under such a scenario the State has no need for Mr. Jodoin to consent because law enforcement can rely on the search warrant to obtain a chemical test. Assume law enforcement attempts to obtain a search warrant but is unable to do so. Under such a scenario the State has no need for Mr. Jodoin to consent to a chemical test because as per McNeely and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) law enforcement could obtain a chemical test in reliance on search incident to arrest combined with exigent circumstances. Because the Department has not and cannot demonstrate a need for implied consent laws detached from the warrant requirement, North Dakota's implied consent law as applied to the facts of Mr. Jodoin's case is unconstitutional because law enforcement failed to even consider obtaining a search

warrant and instead used the implied consent law to obtain Mr. Jodoin's consent. See Beylund at ¶25 ("the sanction for refusal . . . serves as a strong inducement to take the test").

[¶46] The North Dakota Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of a statute unless it is "clearly shown to contravene the state or federal constitution." Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 7, 595 N.W.2d 285. Article I, Section 20 of North Dakota's Constitution states that "[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate." This concept embedded in our State Constitution is basically the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions that was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Frost, at 596.

[¶47] In North Dakota therefore the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applies not only as applied through the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution but also as a mandate of the State Constitution. As such the search warrant requirement found in the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 8 and the right to refuse a warrantless search cannot be excepted by North Dakota's implied consent law that conditions the privilege to drive on the surrender of the right to refuse a warrantless search. See also State v. Ertelt, 548 N.W.2d 775, 776 (N.D. 1996) ("Unlike the United States Constitution, which "is an instrument of grants of authority" to enact legislation (see Art. I, § 8, U.S. Const.), our North Dakota Constitution "is an instrument of limitations of authority" to enact legislation (see Art. IV, § 13, N.D. Const.). State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 965 (1988). "The North Dakota Legislature thus has plenary powers except as limited by the state constitution, federal constitution, and

congressional acts, [], and treaties of the United States.” Id.”).

[¶48] The Department often argues that a driver must demonstrate an “unconstitutional search” for application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to apply. The case usually cited by the Department, Council of Independent Tobacco Manufacturers of America v. State, 713 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006), however does not support the Department’s claim. In the Tobacco case the Minnesota Supreme Court only indicated that “to invoke this “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, appellants must first show the statute in question in fact denies them a benefit they could otherwise obtain by giving up their First Amendment rights.” Id. at 306. The Tobacco case does not require that the statute be unconstitutional by itself to apply the doctrine only that the statute requires the surrender of a constitutional right in return for a privilege that could not be obtained any other way. In Tobacco the Court found that the statute did not prevent the plaintiff’s from exercising their first amendment rights. Id. at 307 (“Thus, the focus of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is on whether a governmental entity is denying a benefit to Plaintiffs that they could obtain by giving up their freedom of speech, or is penalizing them for refusing to give up their First Amendment rights.”). Compared to Mr. Jodoin’s situation however the North Dakota law does condition his driving on the surrender of a constitutional right, specifically requiring him to consent to a warrantless search and making it a crime (punishing him) if he does not. Mr. Jodoin could not otherwise obtain the privilege to drive except by following North Dakota law.

[¶49] It is well settled that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes her constitutionally protected interests . . .” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).

If it could, the “exercise of those [interests] would in effect be penalized and inhibited.”

Id. An example of a comparative application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to rights under the fourth amendment can be found in Dearmore v. City of Garland, 400 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Tex. 2005). In Dearmore, the City of Garland, Texas, imposed an ordinance that provided that owners of residential property must obtain a license in order to rent the property. Id. As a condition of the license, owners were to consent to an inspection of the property from the City of Garland once a year, and failure to do so was an offense. Id. The ordinance, however, also provided authorization for the City of Garland to obtain a search warrant if consent to the inspection was refused or could not be obtained. Id. The court stated:

[T]he property owner is being penalized for his failure to consent in advance to a warrantless search of unoccupied property. The property owner’s consent thus is not voluntary at all. A valid consent involves a waiver of constitutional rights and must be voluntary and uncoerced. The alternatives presented to the property owner are to consent in advance to a warrantless inspection, or to face criminal penalties; thus consent is involuntary. On the other hand, if the owner does not consent to the warrantless search, he does not receive a permit. The whole purpose of receiving a permit is to rent the property for commercial purposes. Without a permit, the owner cannot engage in lawful commercial activity. The owner is thus faced with equally unavailing situations.

Id. at 902-03 (internal citations omitted). Subsequently, the district court enjoined the City of Garland from enforcing any provision of the ordinance that required a person renting property to allow inspection of the property as a condition of issuing a permit, or penalize a person for refusing an inspection. Id. at 906. The City subsequently amended the ordinance, removing the provisions related to consent and clarifying the circumstances under which the City of Garland may seek a warrant. Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2008). As in Dearmore just as an owner’s failure to

consent is an offense a driver's failure to consent in North Dakota is an offense making the application of the law unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.

[¶50] In rejecting the argument that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions invalidates North Dakota's implied consent laws the North Dakota Supreme Court in Beylund relied on the balancing test articulated in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) known as the "special needs balancing test" that was born out of the Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' " Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S., at 351, 105 S.Ct., at 748 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment).") and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) line of cases. Those cases however articulate that such an analysis is only appropriate for cases "outside the normal needs of law enforcement." In other words, if law enforcement is presently engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," the rule is to get a warrant or prove an exception. If the search is being performed for some other reason, the court can balance the intrusion against the State's compelling interest. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012). Accordingly, the first

step in any Fourth Amendment analysis is not to look at the “nature of the intrusion,” but rather the “purpose of the intrusion.” And if that purpose is to ferret out crime, no balancing test is used, the State needs to get a warrant or prove an exception.

[¶51] Regarding law enforcement’s contact with Mr. Jodoin the purpose of the intrusion was to ferret out crime. Therefore, this is not a “special needs” case, but rather a case involving the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, no balancing is permitted. The United States Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) explains that the court cannot “balance needs” for law enforcement engaged in a primary criminal investigation. The question presented in Ferguson was “whether the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 70. To reach a determination of this question the Ferguson court explained why a special needs balancing test was not appropriate

[b]ecause law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’ view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose. Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program, which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of “special needs.”

Id. at 84 (footnotes omitted).

[¶52] It appears in Beylund that the special needs balancing test was used to “immunize” North Dakota’s implied consent law by defining its constitutionality based on the statute’s “ultimate rather than immediate purpose.” Such an approach is

inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment as the Ferguson Court went on to state in explaining its decision

a motive, however, cannot justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law enforcement with the development and application of the MUSC policy. The stark and unique fact that characterizes this case is that Policy M-7 was designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would be turned over to the police and that could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions. While respondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious problem, “the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.” Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S., at 42–43, 121 S.Ct. 447. The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applies to such a policy. See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S., at 308, 117 S.Ct. 1295; Skinner, 489 U.S., at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402.

Id. at 85-86. Therefore, because the circumstances of this case involve law enforcement engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime an analysis of the constitutionality of North Dakota’s implied consent and refusal law regarding the fourth amendment should not entail use of the “special needs” balancing test and instead law enforcement must obtain a warrant or prove an exception.

[¶53] CONCLUSION

[¶54] “Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (Idaho 2014). The notion that a driver “consents” to a warrantless search in return for the privilege of driving would violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, at least when the driver is unable to revoke that consent free of criminal penalty. “The “unconstitutional conditions doctrine vindicates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013). Thus, the “government may not grant a benefit on

the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right.” Amelkin v. McClure, 330 F.3d 822, 827 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, *Unconstitutional Conditions*, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989)); see also Richard A. Epstein, *Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent*, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 67 (1988) (“In its canonical form, this doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”). It would be a “palpable incongruity” to strike down a legislative act that expressly divests a person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but to uphold an act “by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.” Frost, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).

[¶55] Although the government may have a compelling interest to investigate drinking and driving scenarios North Dakota’s current implied consent laws that condition the privilege to drive on the waiver of a constitutional right and further criminalize the exercise of that right are not the least restrictive means to accomplish that goal. The situation could be easily remedied by incorporation of a warrant requirement. Instead of trying to circumvent the warrant requirement North Dakota law should embrace it. See McNeely at 1561 (“In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”).

[¶56] Accordingly based on the foregoing arguments and law Mr. Jodoin respectfully

requests that the Department's decision be reversed.

Dated: August 3, 2015

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IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Dirk Edmond Jodoin,

Appellant/Petitioner,

v.

Grant Levi, Director of the North
Dakota Department of Transportation,

Appellee/Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 20150185
District Court Case No. 45-2014-CV-00063

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE FOR
APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPENDIX**

**APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
STARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THE
HONORABLE ZANE ANDERSON,
AFFIRMING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

[¶1] Thomas F. Murtha IV is an attorney licensed in good standing in the State of North Dakota, Attorney ID 06984, and states that on August 3, 2015 he electronically served the following on the Appellee:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

by sending an electronic copy to the email address dbanders@nd.gov.

Dated: August 3, 2015

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